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LET JUSTICE FLOW LIKE WATER:
THE ROLE OF MORAL ARGUMENT
IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
David L. Fitzgerald*
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's right of privacy jurisprudence has generated
significant controversy in the last thirty years.1 Much of this controversy flows from the fact that this substantive right, although2
grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
has little textual basis. Certainly, it can not be assumed to flow from
the procedural terms of the Fourteenth Amendment itself.3 This Note
critiques the due process jurisprudence of the Supreme Court from
Griswold v. Connecticut4 to PlannedParenthoodv. Casey5 by focusing
on a recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Compas-

sion in Dying v. Washington,6 which draws much of its legal and intel-

lectual force from substantive due process precedents. Compassion in
Dying extends these precedents and recognizes a substantial liberty
* I would like to thank Erica for her endless patience. In addition, I would like
to thank all my teachers, including my parents, who taught me, following St. Ignatius,
to do all things Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam.
1. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 97 (1990) [hereinafter Bork,
The Tempting of America] (noting that the " 'right of privacy' has become a loose
canon in the law"); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v.
Wade, 82 Yale LJ. 920, 927-37 (1973) [hereinafter Ely, The Wages of Crying Wol]
(arguing that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 (1973), lacks constitutional support); Gene R.
Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of Constitutional Liberty,
1985 Wis. L. Rev. 1305, 1306 (noting the inability of the Supreme Court to agree on a
grounding for privacy rights).
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment states, "nor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law" ld; see also John Hart Ely,
Democracy and Distrust 15 (1980) [hereinafter Ely, Democracy and Distrust] (noting
that, at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, "[w]hat recorded comment there was ... is devoid of any reference that gives the provision more than a
procedural connotation").
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert granted sub nonm. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. CtL 37 (1996). The Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 1, 1996,
and the case was argued on January 8, 1997. The Court's decision is expected early in
the Summer of 1997. U.S.L.W. (BNA-Daily Edition) January 17,1997. The case deals
with the question of whether competent, terminally ill patients have a constitutional
right to the assistance of their physician in terminating their own lives. Compassion in
Dying, 79 F.3d at 793. As this Note will discuss, the resolution of Compassion in
Dying will likely determine the future of substantive due process jurisprudence generally. See infra notes 17-29 and accompanying text. How the Supreme Court resolves
the issue of physician assisted suicide will determine the legitimacy and vitality of its
holdings in the abortion context. This Note will argue for a particular mode of legal
reasoning which has the possibility of securing political legitimacy for substantive due
process rights generally.
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interest, grounded in the Due Process Clause, in controlling the time
and manner of one's death.7 Therefore, this decision provides fallow
and topical grounds for criticizing the moral anthropology underlying
substantive due process jurisprudence.
This Note looks at Compassion in Dying, and the Supreme Court's
substantive due process cases upon which it rests, 8 through the spectrum of political legitimacy. 9 The goal is not to criticize the specific
holdings in these cases; rather, this Note attempts to examine the
method of argument in substantive due process cases and show why
that method fails to secure political legitimacy for the specific due process rights which those cases protect.
This inquiry is necessary given the tentative footing on which substantive due process rests.10 In the modem era, the Court has
grounded substantive due process rights on two prongs. 1 The first
prong was established in Palko v. Connecticut'2 in which Justice Cardozo found that a substantive due process right exists if the right in
question is essential to the concept of "ordered liberty" such that
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if [the right was] sacrificed.' 13
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,'4 the plurality opinion articulated
the second prong of substantive due process inquiry: Substantive
rights are protected if they are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition.' 1 5 This second test requires that a substantive right
have a historical pedigree in order to merit protection.' 6 The
Supreme Court, in Bowers v. Hardwick,'7 explicitly adopted this historical and "backward-looking" approach to substantive due pro7. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.

8. This Note examines Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992);
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Bowers v. Hard-

wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
9. For a definition and discussion of this term see infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
10. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 Ind.

LJ.215, 216 (1987) (noting that, "[s]horn of any viable theoretical foundation, substantive due process may well be headed for its second death"); see also Brian C.
Goebel, Who Decides If There Is "Triumph in the Ultimate Agony?" Constitutional
Theory and the Emerging Right to Die with Dignity, 37 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 827, 863-

64 (1996) (discussing the confused nature of current substantive due process
jurisprudence).
11. Anthony C. Cicia, Note, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A CriticalAnalysis of
Justice Harlan'sSubstantive Due Process Formulation, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2241, 2256

(1996).
12. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
13. Id. at 326.
14. 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plurality opinion).

15.
16.
(1995)
17.

Id. at 503.
See James E. Fleming, Securing DeliberativeAutonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 57
[hereinafter Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy].
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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cess."8 Such an approach effectively prevents using the Due Process
Clause as a source of new rights because only traditional rights merit
protection. The question facing constitutional theorists after Bowers
was whether the Supreme Court, in that decision, precluded further
use of the Due Process Clause as a source for recognizing new rights.' 9
Subsequent due process cases have not adequately answered that
question. The Court in Casey upheld the "essential holding" of Roe v.
Wade2 and therefore refused to completely undermine a woman's
right to an abortion.2 It is possible, however, that Casey rested solely
on stare decisis and not on substantive due process.' Therefore, its
holding is unique, and the reasoning of Casey should not be extended
beyond the limited context of abortion. 23 The Court's holding in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health24 also provides
limited guidance for determining whether substantive due process remains a generative force for new substantive rights. The Cruzan
Court held that a state may require clear and convincing proof of the
wishes of a patient in a persistent vegetative state before doctors may
discontinue life support.25 In order to support this holding, however,
the Court did not need to reach the question of whether there was a
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. The Court merely assumed that such a right existed.26 It did not need to affirmatively hold
18. See Fleming, Securing DeliberativeAutonomy, supra note 16, at 58.
19. See Conkle, supra note 10, at 216 (arguing that Bowers could be used as a
mechanism for overturning all substantive due process cases); see also Thomas B.
Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick. Precedentby PersonalPredilection,54 U. Chi. L Rev.
648, 652-54 (1987) (arguing that in deciding Bowers the Supreme Court abandoned
earlier right of privacy precedents); Brett J. Williamson, Note, The ConstitutionalPrivacy DoctrineAfter Bowers v. Hardwick. Rethinking the Second Death of Substantive
Due Process,62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1297, 1297 (1989) (trying to distinguish Bowers from
other substantive due process cases).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
22. Id.at 853 ("While we appreciate the weight of the arguments made on behalf
of the State in the cases before us... the reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty
we have given combined with the force of stare decisis.")
23. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 848 (9th Cir.) (en banc)
(Beezer, J., dissenting) (arguing that "Casey's reaffirmation of the abortion right is
best understood as a decision that relies heavily on stare decisis; the abortion right,
uniquely protected under the undue burden standard, is sui generis"), cert. grantedsub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996); Mark E. Chopko & Michael F.
Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a Wonderful Life?, 70 Notre Dame L Rev. 519, 549
(1995) ("This underscores all the more that abortion now appears to occupy its own
jurisprudential island, with no readily explainable relation to the remainder of the
Court's substantive due process cases.").
24. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). This case dealt with the right of family members to withdraw life support from incompetent, terminally ill patients and what standard of proof
about patient's wishes the state may compel such family members to meet before
permitting the termination of life support. Id. at 265, 280.
25. Id. at 279.
26. Id.
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that the Due Process Clause guaranteed this right because the state's
interest in preserving the patient's life justified the high evidentiary
requirement.2 7
Given this confusion, the Supreme Court's resolution of the substantive due process questions raised by Compassion in Dying will
have profound ramifications for substantive due process doctrine generally. If the Court accepts the substantive due process basis for the
Ninth Circuit holding, it will have to face the crisis of legitimacy engendered by current substantive due process jurisprudence. If the
Court rejects outright the substantive due process reasoning of Compassion in Dying, it will effectively undermine the theoretical ground
on which controversial decisions, especially the abortion decisions,
rest.28 Therefore, the Court will need to ground the right to an abortion on firmer footing in the future if it wishes to avoid resting a controversial right on a discredited and problematic doctrine. This Note
explores a possible method of argument for the Court to follow in the
future which could secure not only the right to an abortion, but also
political legitimacy for that right.29
27. Id at 281-82; see Chopko & Moses, supra note 23, at 564.
28. This reasoning holds even if the Court finds a right to physician-assisted suicide in the Equal Protection Clause, as the Second Circuit held in Quill v. Vacco, 80
F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996), the companion case to Compassion in Dying in the Supreme Court. In Quill, the Second Circuit struck down a New
York statute forbidding physician-assisted suicide on rather unusual grounds. The
court refused to expand the list of substantive due process rights on its own authority.
Id. at 724-25. Rather, the court found that New York law allowed terminally ill patients on life support to hasten their own deaths by terminating that life support. New
York denied this ability to terminally ill patients who were not on life support, however, because they could not seek the aid of their physicians in terminating their lives.
Id. at 719. The court reviewed equal protection doctrine and found that competent
terminally ill patients are not part of a suspect class, nor do they have a fundamental
right to die. Id. at 726. Accordingly, the court applied rational basis review to the
statute. ld at 727. Under this standard, state action which classifies similarly situated
groups differently must bear some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). The court found, however, that the distinction
drawn by New York between competent, terminally ill patients on life support and
competent, terminally ill patients not on life support failed to pass even this low standard of review and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause. Quill, 80 F.3d at
727-29. If the Supreme Court follows the reasoning of the Second Circuit and strikes
down all state statutes preventing physician-assisted suicide in states that allow competent persons to terminate life support, such a decision, of course, would not resolve
the confusion in substantive due process jurisprudence.
29. Professor Cass Sunstein, whose general work is discussed infra in the text accompanying at notes 145-64, also attempts this project to some degree. He sees the
Due Process Clause as essentially backward looking, offering protection only to traditional practices against short-term departures. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 131-33 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Partial Constitution]; James E.
Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 263 (1993)
[hereinafter Fleming, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution]. Therefore, he argues
for protection of non-traditional practices like abortion on equal protection grounds.
See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra, at 272. Professor Sunstein hopes to
avoid the illegitimacy problem of the Due Process Clause by grounding substantive
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This Note argues that the failure of substantive due process jurisprudence to secure legitimacy is the result of the philosophical presuppositions underlying those decisions. These decisions rest on a
Rawlsian thesis that true moral agreement is impossible in a pluralistic
society.3" They argue therefore that it is futile to try to secure legitimacy in constitutional interpretation on moral agreement. This Note
argues that such a belief in moral intelligibility is unfounded. Enough
moral agreement is possible to legitimize constitutional rights. Furthermore, this Note demonstrates, drawing on the work of Michael
Sandel, that the only way to secure widespread legitimacy for any constitutional right is to abandon the liberal project of toleration and look
instead to ground the right in the moral good of the practice which the
right in question protects.
To this end, part I examines what is meant by political legitimacy
and outlines the types of arguments to which governmental actors, including judges, must appeal to secure it. It also reveals the judicial
disagreement in recent substantive due process jurisprudence, and
shows that this disagreement flows from the idea that moral agreement is not possible in a pluralistic society.
Part II closely explores the majority opinion of Judge Reinhardt in
Compassion in Dying. Judge Reinhardt's reasoning clearly demonstrates the liberal3 philosophical basis of substantive due process jurisprudence,3' especially its dependence on the work of John Rawls.
This part also raises questions with the anthropological presupposirights in the Equal Protection Clause. However, because Professor Sunstein shares
the basic philosophical commitments of those who wish to ground unenumerated substantive rights on an expansive reading of the Due Process Clause, his method also
fails to secure legitimacy for those rights. See infra part N.B.
30. This Note examines the significant influence of John Rawls on substantive due
process jurisprudence. For an interesting discussion of Rawls's ideas about the possibility of moral agreement in a pluralistic society, see Paul F. Campos, Secular Fundamentalism, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1814, 1823 (1994) (arguing that Rawls's concept of
political liberalism requires an acceptance of what Rawls has described as the "practical impossibility of reaching reasonable and workable political agreement" on the
truth of comprehensive moral doctrines).
31. This Note will point out that the philosophy of liberalism includes within it the
modem American political spectrum characterized by the terms "conservative" and
"liberal." For example both Newt Gingrich and Bill Clinton share the same basic
philosophical presuppositions. Where they differ is in how best to effectuate this philosophy. See Liberalism Defined, Economist, Dec. 21, 1996, at 17-19. Obviously, this
is a much different conception of liberalism than is generally understood in modem
American popular political discourse. The popular press often uses the word "liberal"
to describe those who were traditionally called "socialists." See id.
32. This Note will refer to the "aspirational" approach to constitutional interpretation as a way of describing those theorists who argue for a broad reading of the Constitution generally and the Due Process Clause specifically. These theorists are
known for their belief that the judiciary must actively use the broad language of constitutional provisions to vindicate the moral aspirations of the people. See Sotirios A.
Barber, On What the Constitution Means 10 (1984) (defending an aspirational approach to constitutional interpretation); James W. Ducayet, Note, Publius and Federalism: On the Use and Abuse of The Federalist in Constitutional Interpretation, 68
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tions that this philosophy entails. Finally this part argues that liberalism's unsuccessful answers to these questions are responsible for the
current crisis of legitimacy in substantive due process jurisprudence.
Part III examines originalist and progressive theories of constitutional interpretation which provide the traditional critiques of liberal
substantive due process jurisprudence. It examines how these theories attempt to overcome the problems raised with aspirational approaches to constitutional interpretation. Largely because these
theorists share the same liberal presuppositions of the aspirationalists
about both the nature of the human person and the person's relationship with the state, both originalists and progressives also fail to secure legitimacy for substantive due process rights.
To negotiate a solution to these interpretive difficulties, part IV
closely examines the work of Michael Sandel. Professor Sandel calls
for a theory of constitutional interpretation which honors the republican nature of our constitutional system. He argues that in order to
secure legitimacy for substantive due process rights, it is essential that
the polity, in both its legislative and judicial functions, take moral argument seriously. If they are to find widespread acceptance in our
political culture, rights must be referenced to the end of cultivating
the virtues necessary for good citizenship. Professor Sandel cites Justice Dougias's reasoning in Griswold v. Connecticut3 3 as the type of
4
argument necessary for securing legitimacy for due process rights?
This part also explores Professor Sandel's notion that the Court, by
turning away from the reasoning of Griswold, has undermined the legitimacy of substantive due process generally.
The final part examines Sandelian arguments both for and against
physician-assisted suicide. This part frames the issue by first exploring
the aspirational attempt at moral agreement exemplified by the work
of Professor Dworkin, and then shows why this attempt fails to secure
legitimacy for substantive due process rights. It argues that Sandel's
republicanism has a far better chance of securing political legitimacy
than does aspirationalism. Whatever the final outcome of this contentious legal issue, the hope is that political and legal argument will take
moral questions seriously, and hence have a better chance of securing
legitimacy than the recent judicial attempts to secure rights on a conception of the human person as autonomous, inviolable, and under no
obligation to justify personal actions."5

N.Y.U. L. Rev. 821, 847-48 (1993) (arguing that originalism forecloses aspirational
arguments).
33. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
34. See infra part IV.
35. See Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy 7-8 (1996) [hereinafter Sandel, Democracy's Discontent].
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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND LEGITIMACY

All right of privacy decisions, including Compassion in Dying, have
produced serious criticism from political, legal, and academic circles.'
This part examines the nature of judicial disagreement over substantive due process jurisprudence. It also discusses the relationship between moral agreement and political legitimacy and shows that some
level of moral agreement is necessary to secure meaningful political
legitimacy.
A.

Outlining JudicialDisagreement in Recent Substantive Due
Process Jurisprudence

Both the Supreme Court in Casey and the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying were deeply divided over the existence of the right in
question. The Casey Court could secure a majority only on its specific
holding, which reaffirmed that a woman has a constitutional right to
an abortion.3 7 The extent and grounding of that right produced deep
disagreement even among the Justices who voted to affirm that "essential holding" 38 of Roe v. Wade.3 9 The Casey joint opinion also occasioned deep and biting dissents from Justices Rehnquist and
Scalia.4 °
36. See George C. Christie, A Model of JudicialReview of Legislation, 48 S.Cal. L

Rev. 1306, 1308 (1975) (outlining a model of judicial review which avoids the charge

of judicial subjectivity in fashioning legal rules); Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Inter-

pretation and the Powerof the Judiciary,7 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 87, 98 (1984) (arguing that the more ambiguous a legal text is, the less power judges have to enforce
compliance with their conclusions); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, supra note 1, at
937-938 (showing how the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973), is similar to its discredited decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 405
(1905)); Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming
Moral Convictions into Law, 98 Yale LJ.1501, 1513-18 (1989) (book review) (discussing some of the problems with the liberal political philosophy which undergirds modem substantive due process jurisprudence).
37. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992).
at 922 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (worrying that the right to an abor38. See id.
tion is now on weak footing).
39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 944, 954 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "[w]hile purporting to adhere to precedent, the joint
opinion instead revises it. Roe continues to exist, but only in the way a storefront on a
western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality."); id. at 979
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia added:
The emptiness of the "reasoned judgment" that produced Roe is displayed in
plain view by the fact that, after more than 19 years of effort by some of the
brightest (and most determined) legal minds in the country, after more than
10 cases upholding abortion rights in this Court, and after dozens upon dozens of amicus briefs submitted in these and other cases, the best the Court
can do to explain how it is that the word "liberty" must be thought to include
the right to destroy human fetuses is to rattle off a collection of adjectives
that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice.
Id at 983.
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Similarly, the history of the Compassion in Dying right to die litigation, which has recently dominated the substantive due process center
stage, is long and divisive. The district court ruled that the Washington statute outlawing physician-assisted suicide was unconstitutional.41
A three-judge Ninth Circuit panel voted two-to-one to reverse the district court.42 On rehearing, the Ninth Circuit en banc reversed the
decision of the three-judge panel and affirmed the district court's
judgment, by a vote of eight-to-three. 43 Finally, a request for a rehearing before the entire Circuit was denied over strenuous dissent
from three judges.' Such profound and lasting disagreement calls
into question the legitimacy of the substantive due process line of
cases both within the judiciary and among the public in general."
B. Moral Intelligibility and Legitimacy
Some level of moral agreement is necessary to secure legitimacy for
political decisions. This section addresses the roots of the judicial disagreement over substantive due process jurisprudence and discusses
41. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1459-60 (W.D. Wash.
1994) ("[T]his court finds the reasoning in Casey highly instructive and almost prescriptive on the [issue of physician-assisted suicide].").
42. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1995). The
panel reflected that it would be impossible to reign in this practice if the right contemplated by the district court were accepted at face value:
The depressed twenty-one year old, the romantically-devastated twentyeight year old, the alcoholic forty-year old who choose suicide are also expressing their views of the existence, meaning, the universe, and life; they
are also asserting their personal liberty. If at the heart of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is this uncurtailable ability to believe
and to act on one's deepest beliefs about life, the right to suicide and the
right to assistance in suicide are the prerogative of at least every sane adult.
Id.
43. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)
("A common thread running through these [substantive due process] cases is that
they involve decisions that are highly personal and intimate, as well as of great importance to the individual. Certainly, few decisions are more personal, intimate or important than the decision to end one's life. . .

."

(footnote omitted)).

44. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85 F.3d 1440, 1440 (9th Cir.)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc), cert. granted sub nom.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996). Judge O'Scannlain noted:
By promulgating a new constitutional right, one unheard of in over two hundred years of American history, six men and two women-endowed with life
tenure and cloaked in the robes of this court-have enacted by judicial flat
what the people of the State of Washington declined to do at the polls only
five years ago.
Compassion in Dying, 85 F.3d at 1440.
45. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the confusion in post-Roe abortion
decisions); see also Goebel, supra note 10, at 863-64 (noting that judicial disagreement
on how to apply substantive due process cases and doctrine has tarnished the legitimacy of constitutional decisions); Francis S. Chlapowski, Note, The Constitutional
Protectionof InformationalPrivacy, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 133, 142 (1991) (noting disagreements in substantive due process cases).

1997]

LET JUSTICE FLOW LIKE WATER

2111

the relationship between legitimacy and moral agreement. It suggests
that the current legitimacy crisis of substantive due process jurisprudence stems from the liberal presupposition that moral agreement in a
pluralistic society is impossible.
Before analyzing the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's substantive
due process jurisprudence, it is first necessary to discuss what is meant
by legitimacy. A legitimate action is one that, even if one thinks it is
wrong or foolish, can be accepted as comporting with a deeper sense
of justice. 4' Legitimacy is about governmental action comporting with
a shared sense of what is right, just, and fair.47
46. There are, of course, competing versions of legitimacy. John Rawls, discussed
in more detail infra in the text accompanying notes 79-101, provides a liberal definition of legitimacy:
[O]ur exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and
ideals acceptable to their common human reason.
John Rawls, Political Liberalism 137 (1993) [hereinafter Rawls, Political Liberalism].
One of the main goals of this Note is to point out that Professor Rawls's rationalist
conception of legitimacy is too narrow. A people's sense of legitimacy is more instinctual and drawn from a broader ground of experience than is implicated simply by use
of the reason. Legitimacy is primarily about a communal sense of justice, rooted in
the imagination. Although imagination has a rational component, it is in many ways
pre-rational in the sense that much of our imagination is inherited unquestioningly as
a function of the myths which constitute our community. See J.P.M. Walsh, Si., The
Mighty from Their Thrones 8-10 (1987) [hereinafter Walsh, The Mighty from Their
Thrones]. Hence:
The widow's plight triggers our sense of what is right, fair, just, seemly, reasonable, and so on: our sense of sedeq [translated as "justice"]. Our reaction has several aspects. There is our desire to stand up for what is right, to
see [justice] vindicated. There is our desire to see the person who is in the
right vindicated, as well.
Id. at 6; see generally Ellis Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution: A Biographical Introduction (1981) [hereinafter Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution] (discussing the
work of Eric Voegelin). Voegelin argued for a recapturing of the tradition of thought,
that had its roots in both Ancient Greece and Ancient Israel, which held that human
spiritual development requires a discovery "that existence demands attunement to the
truth of being." Id. at 119. The essence of a community for Voegelin is a recognition
of participation in a greater whole and an attempt to render that whole intelligible
through symbol and myth. Id at 151. Voegelin identifies the modem crisis of philosophy generally and political philosophy in particular as a failure to realize that all our
symbols, including our law, are divorced from their essentially divine ground. Id. at
185-87. For Voegelin, the category error which leads to illegitimacy is the classical
fallacy that "man is the measure" of all things. Id.at 155 (citations omitted). Because
legitimacy derives from an objective sense of what is just, it is possible to say that the
best regime is one that educates its citizens in the virtues in order to secure the common good. This is directly antithetical to a liberal conception of legitimacy which
holds that the only role of government is to secure a minimum order that leaves individuals alone to pursue their own freely chosen ends. Alasdair Maclntyre, Whose
Justice? Which Rationality? 201 (1988) [hereinafter Macntyre, Whose Justice?
Which Rationality?].
47. See Walsh, The Mighty from Their Thrones, supra note 46, at 7 (noting that
"[c]onversely, the established order and its ordinary exercise of mispat [translated as
"power"] derive legitimacy from people's convictions about [justice]"); Richard
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The philosophical ground and the mode of argument of substantive
due process jurisprudence, exemplified by Judge Reinhardt's opinion
in Compassion in Dying,' forecloses precisely the type of argument
that would render legitimate the rights articulated in cases like Casey
and Compassion in Dying. The liberal conception of the human person articulated by Judge Reinhardt makes it impossible to appeal to
any shared conception of justice because jurists like Judge Reinhardt
doubt that such a shared conception can exist in a pluralistic society.4 9
Even if such a consensus does exist, no branch of the government may
appeal to it to justify its actions because the Constitution requires governmental neutrality toward conceptions of the good." If this is so,
no governmental action-certainly not one taken by the antimajoritarian judiciary-can be considered legitimate because there is
no moral backdrop against which those actions can be defended. 1
Public actors have a hard time rallying the citizenry behind a decision
because they are precluded from tapping into the very moral imagination that would lend weight and credence to their actions.5
II.

OUTLINING THE LIBERAL PHILOSOPHICAL GROUND OF

COMPASSION IN DYING AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

JURISPRUDENCE

As the previous part revealed, serious problems plague substantive
due process jurisprudence and adversely effect the political legitimacy
of judicial decisions. This part explores the roots of these problems by
looking closely at the legal reasoning of Judge Reinhardt's majority
opinion in Compassion in Dying. 3 In an attempt to understand the
animating principles behind Compassion in Dying, this part explores
Warner, Why Pragmatism? The Puzzling Place of Pragmatism in Critical Theory,

1993 U. Ill. L. Rev. 535, 541-42 (arguing that governmental choices are based on
norms of justice); Ron Replogle, Note, The Scope of Representation-ReinforcingJudicial Review, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1592, 1602-03 (1992) (noting that if a decision is going
to be considered legitimate it must in some way comport with a sense of justice).
48. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. grantedsub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996); see infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (noting that political decisions on a liberal model cannot be based
solely on comprehensive conceptions of the good).
49. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (discussing the affinities between Rawls and Reinhardt).
50. See infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
51. See id.
52. Michael Sandel notes:
[W]e are beginning to find that a politics that brackets morality and religion
too completely soon generates its own disenchantment. A procedural republic cannot contain the moral energies of a vital democratic life. It creates
a moral void that opens the way for narrow, intolerant moralisms. And it
fails to cultivate the qualities of character that equip citizens to share in selfrule.
Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 24.
53. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
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the work of John Rawls, demonstrating how Rawlsian political philosophy supplies the current theoretical underpinning for substantive due
process jurisprudence.
A. The Legal Reasoning of Compassion in Dying
For the purposes of this Note, Judge Reinhardt's majority opinion
in Compassion in Dying serves as a foil for other cases decided on
substantive due process grounds. The case is not chosen, at least not
primarily, to examine the correctness of its holding. Rather, this Note
explores the case in order to uncover the philosophical presuppositions inherent within it and other controversial substantive due
process cases.5 4 In order to understand these philosophical presuppositions, however it is necessary to dissect the legal context in which
they come into play.
1. The Mode of Inquiry
Washington enacted a statute making it a crime for any person to
"aid" a terminally ill, mentally competent adult in hastening his own
death through the use of medication prescribed by his doctor. 5 This
practice is commonly referred to as physician-assisted suicide.56 In order to determine whether terminally ill patients had a constitutional
right to this practice, the Ninth Circuit framed the issue in substantive
54. The goal of this Note is not to advocate a repeal of the rights guaranteed in
substantive due process cases from Grisvold v. Connecticut to Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (guaranteeing the
right of marital privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (guaranteeing the
right of unmarried persons to purchase contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (protecting a woman's right to an abortion); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (protecting the right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming a woman's
right to an abortion). What is important for this inquiry is not whether the defense of
a particular right or practice is persuasive. Rather, this Note explores the Court's
mode of argument and theoretical alternatives to that mode of argument in these
volatile and divisive cases to determine if the practices, whether they are ultimately
protected or left open to state regulation or prohibition, can ever be accepted by the
polity as legitimate.
55. "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes
or aids another person to attempt suicide." Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.060(1)
(West 1988); Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 797.
56. For further discussion of this topic, see Charles H. Baron et al.,
A Model State
Act to Authorize and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 Harv. J. on Legis. 1
(1996); Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician.AssistedSuicide.: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. Rich. L Rev. 1 (1996); Goebel,
supra note 10; Ronald S. Kaniuk, European Perspectives Towards Euthanasia and
Physician-AssistedSuicide, 9 N.Y. Int'l L Rev. 85 (1996); Sylvia A. Law, PhysicianAssisted Death An Essay on ConstitutionalRights and Remedies, 55 Md. L Rev. 292
(1996); Paul J. Zwier, Lookingfor a Nonlegal Process: Physician-AssistedSuicide and
the Care Perspective, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 199 (1996).
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due process terms, inquiring: "[I]s [there] a liberty interest in choosing the time and manner of one's death... [i]s there a right to die?"'57
The court quickly dispensed with the idea that the liberties contemplated by the Due Process Clause are only those specifically enumerated elsewhere in the Constitution. 58 Rather, the court, following
recent Supreme Court precedent in substantive due process jurisprudence, chose to apply a test that balanced the contemplated
rights of
59
the individual against the interests of the state.
2.

Grounding the Liberty Interest

The Compassion in Dying court favorably cited Justice Brandeis's
famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States60 for the proposition that
the Framers sought to "protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations" and that, as against the
government, all people have "the right to be let alone. '61 Although
Olmstead was decided under the Fourth Amendment, Judge Reinhardt's use of this language indicates his larger moral anthropology:
Human beings exercise their "spiritual nature" 62 and render judgments about their "thoughts" and "beliefs" in solitude. 63 According
to this view, at the very least, in our constitutional order, citizens must
be free to decide moral questions apart from government interference. Judge Reinhardt also quotes Brandeis's notion that this "right"
is "the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by
civilized men." 64 This language has serious implications for how
Judge Reinhardt would adjudicate the legitimacy of government actions. According to Judge Reinhardt, rooted in the American consensus about what is just, and therefore, in the consensus about what the
57. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 798-99; see also Marc Spindelman, Are the

Similarities Between a Woman's Right to Choose an Abortion and the Alleged Right to

Assisted Suicide Really Compelling?,29 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 775, 797 (1996) (noting that
the right to die must be framed as a liberty interest).
58. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 799.

59. L; see Kevin M. Stansbury, Case Note, 31 Land & Water L. Rev. 623, 632
(1996). For further discussion of the Court's use of balancing when confronted with a
liberty interest see Chlapowski, supra note 45, at 144-45 (discussing the balancing
approach in the fundamental rights context); Anne Marie Gaudin, Note, Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health.. To Die or Not to Die: That Is the Question-But Who Decides?, 51 La. L. Rev. 1307, 1318-20 (1991) (discussing the Supreme

Court's application of a balancing test in the context of the right to refuse life sustaining medical treatment); Michael W. Macleod-Ball, Note, The Future of Zoning
Limitations upon Religious Uses of Land Due Process or Equal Protection?,22 Suf-

folk U. L. Rev. 1087, 1101-02 (1988) (discussing courts' willingness to balance personal liberty interests against state interests).
60. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
61. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 800 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
62. Id
63. Id
64. Id
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government may legitimately do, is the notion that there is no role for
the state in the realm of the citizenry's moral decision making.6
The court next drew an analogy between the right of privacy contemplated by the abortion decisions and the right-to-die cases.66 As in
the abortion context, where the question of whether the state may
interfere with the decision of the mother to terminate her pregnancy
hinges on fetal viability, 67 the outcome of the balancing test in rightto-die cases might differ depending upon the point in the life cycle at
which suicide is sought. Both situations raise issues of life and death,
arouse similar moral concerns, and, in both contexts, the state has had
only partial success in preventing the practices. 68 Most importantly
for this inquiry, both cases present basic questions about an individual's right of choice. 69 Logically, then, the Compassion in Dying court
looked to Casey as the controlling precedent and identified its central
message: "[C]hoices central to personal dignity and autonomy[ ] are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."70
Furthermore, the court found that decisions concerning abortion and
assisted suicide inflict too much personal suffering on the individual
for "the State to
insist, without more, upon its own vision of the [indi'71
vidual's] role."
The court opted for an aspirational and evolving approach in determining which substantive rights are protected by the Due Process
Clause, stating that "[i]t is a promise of the Constitution that there is a
realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter."'
65. Judge Reinhardt sees the freedom to make the choice of physician-assisted
suicide as flowing in continuum from other privacy rights earlier recognized by the
Supreme Court. Hence, there is no novelty in his recognition of physician-assisted
suicide. It, like the "right to be let alone" formulated by Brandeis, is essential to just
government. See Christopher N. Manning, Note, Live and Let Die?: Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die, 9 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 513, 530 (1996).
66. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 800-01; see Stansbury, supra note 59, at 632.
67. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992) (concluding that
the line for when a woman can no longer choose to terminate her pregnancy free of
substantial state interference is the point of fetal viability).
68. The court noted that even when abortion was banned, back alley abortions
flourished. The court made a similar argument inregard to physician-assisted suicide-many terminally ill patients, deprived by law of the help of their physicians,
take their own lives, often with tragic consequences. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at
801.
69. Id.
70. ld. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
71. Id.at 805 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 852).
72. ld. at 806 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-48). Constitutional interpreters who
subscribe to the aspirational approach frequently cite favorably, as does Judge Reinhardt, Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). See
Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 804. In Poe,Justice Harlan articulated the approach
to substantive due process which has become the cornerstone of aspirational jurisprudence: "[Tihe full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause ...is a
rational continuum, which broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints ... ." Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). This approach posits that broad and abstract constitutional rights, like
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The court noted that many unenumerated and historically unprotected practices have been protected on this theory of personal autonomy.73 The common thread running through all the due process cases,
the court found, is the basic premise that the individual deserves protection from state interference with respect to decisions of a personal
and intimate nature.74 Therefore, decisional autonomy is an aspirational principle undergirding our constitutional document. 75 Hence,
the court argued that because few, if any, decisions are as important as
the decision to end one's life, the cases provide strong general support
for the proposition that there is a liberty interest in controlling the
time and manner of one's death.76
None of the interests that the state could muster 77 to balance
against the individual's interest in determining the time and manner of
one's death were deemed sufficient to save the challenged portion of
the statute. Accordingly, the court held that although the state may
regulate assisted suicide, it may not totally ban it for terminally ill
patients.78
B.

The Liberal Presuppositionsof Substantive Due Process
Jurisprudence
Having examined the legal reasoning in Compassion in Dying, it is
appropriate to address the philosophical presuppositions upon which
that reasoning rests. To accomplish this, it is necessary to examine the
the right to make intimate personal decisions, must be extended equally to all people
if there are no moral grounds for distinguishing among various groups. Ronald Dworkin, Sex, Death, and the Courts, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 8, 1996, at 44.
73. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 805-07. The Compassion in Dying court
identified several cases in which unenumerated and historically unprotected practices
have been secured on personal autonomy grounds, including: Turner v. Safley, 482
U.S. 78 (1987) (recognizing the right of prisoners to marry); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (recognizing the right of minors to purchase contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing the right to interracial
marriage); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing the right of
marital privacy).
74. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 814-15 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 410 U.S. 261, 281
(1990), for the proposition that the ability to determine the time and manner of one's
death flows from the personal nature of the decision).
75. Id. at 813; see also S.C., ConstitutionalLaw: Due Process of Law-Compassion
in Dying v. Washington, 22 Am. J.L. & Med. 135, 136 (1996) (noting that decisional
autonomy is a vital liberty interest).
76. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 816.
77. The state's proffered interests included the interests in preserving life, preventing suicide, avoiding the involvement of third parties and preventing undue influence,
protecting family and loved ones, protecting the integrity of the medical profession,
and avoiding the adverse consequences which might ensue if the statute were declared unconstitutional. Id. at 817-32.
78. The court noted that "[i]f broad general state policies can be used to deprive a
terminally ill individual of the right to make that choice, it is hard to envision where
the exercise of arbitrary and intrusive power by the state can be halted." Id. at 837; see
Stansbury, supra note 59, at 633-35.
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political philosophy of John Rawls, upon whose philosophical theory
Judge Reinhardt grounded the constitutionally protected right to physician assisted suicide.7 9 Therefore, to understand the holding in
Compassion in Dying, one must understand Rawls.
1. Rawlsian Conception of Justice and the Liberal State
In the classical tradition from Aristotle to Hobbes a polis was based
on a shared conception of the good.80 John Rawls argues that the goal
of the Enlightenment project, particularly the moral/political philosophy of David Hume and Immanuel Kant,8 ' was to free knowledge of
the good from the dictates of revelation.82 For the Enlightenment
moral philosopher, the goal was to construct a conception of the good
79. This Note discusses Professor Rawls's political philosophy as it is set out in two
of his major works, A Theory of Justice (1971) [hereinafter Rawls, A Theory of Justice] and Political Liberalism, supra note 46.
80. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, supra note 29, at 283-84.
This Note does not attempt to resolve the conflict between those who argue that there
is no objective conception of the good and those who believe that truth or the good
has some objective knowable content. See Alasdair Maclntyre, Three Rival Versions
of Moral Enquiry 36 (1990) (discussing but not adopting Nietzsche's commitment to
the notion that "all claims to truth are and can only be made from the standpoint
afforded by some particular perspective"); Leo Strauss, "Relativism," in The Rebirth
of Classical Political Rationalism 13 (Thomas L. Pangle ed., 1989) [hereinafter
Strauss, "Relativism"] (discussing how relativism has crept into modern liberalism); cf.
id at 17 (claiming that every living being must of necessity take "an absolute stand in
accordance with what he regards as the nature of man or as the nature of the human
condition or as the decisive truth"). Rather, this Note argues that some communal
conception of good, whether absolute or conventional, has almost always been enshrined as the basis for political judgments and that the basis for the legitimacy of
political decisions has been referenced to that shared conception. See generally John
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 407-08 (1980) (citing Plato for the proposition
that knowledge of what is better rather than worse should be embodied in the laws of
the polis).
Notions of legitimacy, in both Jerusalem and Athens, support this assertion that
legitimacy is derived from a shared conception of the good. See generally 2 Samuel
12:1-19 (demonstrating the idea that King David is immediately aware of his sin and
that he had violated Israel's conception of justice); Walsh, The Mighty from Their
Thrones, supra note 46, at 23, 31 (noting that God has ultimate authority over the
cosmos and that in accepting this God Ancient Israel was accepting a particular vision
of justice which that God embodied); Maclntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?,
supra note 46, at 73-74 (noting that for Plato the virtue of justice was objective and
outside the self and that both the soul and the polis should be referenced against this
objective standard of justice).
81. "They [Hume and Kant] also believe that the knowledge or awareness of how
we are to act is directly accessible to every person who is normally reasonable and
conscientious." John Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at xxvii.
82. Id This idea flows from the Augustinian doctrine of Original Sin. For Augustine, both human will and human intellect were initially turned toward God, and
therefore, human beings knew and could perform the good. Through the use of freedom, however, human beings turned away from God and, as an everlasting result,
crippled both the intellect and the will such that knowledge of the good was at best
dim and the ability to do the good non-existent. Only the grace of God, entering
history in the person of Jesus Christ and our personal lives through receipt of the
sacraments of the Church, restores humanity from this depraved condition and makes
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based on reason alone and prior to any received conception of justice
either from the religious, political, or social order. 3 This project has
proved elusive and, some would say, illusory.84
Notwithstanding this skepticism, Professor Rawls, in his landmark
work A Theory of Justice,85 argued that justice consists of those guiding social principles that persons would choose, in a seminal state of
equality, to govern their collective life. 86 In the Rawlsian scheme, justice has two first principles neither of which spring from a prior natural order. Rather these principles are grounded in the way citizens are
to be regarded in the public political culture of a constitutional democracy.' Professor Rawls argues that the first principle of justice,
the one relevant for this inquiry, requires that each person have a
claim to a fully adequate scheme, of equal basic rights and liberties. 88
Only if these liberties are guaranteed are freedom and equality possible, because these liberties are the precondition for the exercise of the
two universal moral powers: the capacity for a sense of justice and the
capacity to form a conception of the good.89 Especially relevant in
analyzing the philosophical ground for the Compassion in Dying decivirtue possible. See Roger Haight, S.J., The Experience and Language of Grace 32-51
(1979); MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, supra note 46, at 157.
It is Thomas Aquinas's great achievement that he managed to reinvigorate the natural integrity of both the human intellect and the human will and synthesize those
conceptions with the Augustinian reliance on grace as essential to salvation. For an
interesting reconstruction of the history of this synthesis see id. at 164-82. For further
discussion of the general role of revelation in the history of political philosophy and
politics in general, see Sandoz, The Voegelinian Revolution, supra note 46, at 116-42.
83. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at xxvii.
84. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 1-75 (1981) [hereinafter MacIntyre, After Virtue].
Hence the eighteenth-century moral philosophers engaged in what was an
inevitably unsuccessful project; for they did indeed attempt to find a rational
basis for their moral beliefs in a particular understanding of human nature,
while inheriting a set of moral injunctions on the one hand and a conception
of human nature on the other which had been expressly designed to be discrepant with each other .... They inherited incoherent fragments of a once
coherent scheme of thought and action and, since they did not recognise
their own peculiar historical and cultural situation, they could not recognise
the impossible and quixotic character of their self-appointed task.
Id at 53.
85. See supra note 79.
86. Id at 13-14.
87. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 13-14; Fleming, Constructing
the Substantive Constitution, supra note 29, at 286.
88. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 79, at 60; Fleming, Constructing the
Substantive Constitution, supra note 29, at 285. Rawls identifies what some of these
rights and liberties are, including liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, liberty
of the person, and equal political rights. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note
79, at 61. He notes, "the political system, which I assume to be some form of constitutional democracy, would not be a just procedure if it did not embody these liberties."
Id. at 197-98.
89. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 332; Fleming, Constructing the
Substantive Constitution, supra note 29, at 287.
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sion is the necessity of these liberties in order to secure the exercise of
the second moral power.' As discussed previously,91 the majority
opinion in Compassion in Dying rests its holding on the dicta in Casey
that the Fourteenth Amendment most strenuously protects choices
central to our forming of moral conceptions. 2
In light of the criticism leveled against his ideas, 93 Professor Rawls
has recently backed away from this ambitious theory which grounds
his conception of political justice, and therefore his conception of
which types of government acts are legitimate, on a liberal conception
of the human person as such.94 Professor Rawls has sought a narrower ground for securing social agreement about principles of justice
by retreating from a defense of comprehensive liberalism and moving
instead toward a more limited political or minimalist liberalism. 95
Professor Rawls argues that a shared basis of political agreement cannot be grounded on a single conception of the good without intolerable state oppression. 96 Therefore, a political conception of justice
accepts "the fact of reasonable pluralism," understood as irreconcilable yet reasonable moral doctrines that citizens may affirm. 97 Nevertheless, political agreement is possible if the citizens can come to some
shared understanding-what Professor Rawls calls an overlapping
consensus---concerning a political, as opposed to metaphysical, conception of justice.98 This conception of justice constrains the polity's
90. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 335 ("Liberty of conscience and
freedom of association are to secure the full and informed and effective application of
citizens' powers of deliberative reason to their forming, revising, and rationally pursuing a conception of the good over a complete life.").
91. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
92. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 (9th Cir.) (en banc)
(noting that "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State." (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851
(1992))), cert. grantedsub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. C. 37 (1996).
93. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
94. "The general problems of moral philosophy are not the concern of political
liberalism, except in so far as they affect how the background culture and its comprehensive doctrines tend to support a constitutional regime." Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at xxviii.
95. Id at xxvii; see infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
96. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at xxiii-xxx, 134-37; Fleming,
Constructing the Substantive Constitution,supra note 29, at 284.
97. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 4; Fleming, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution, supra note 29, at 284.
98. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 10-11.
Political liberalism, then, aims for a political conception of justice as a freestanding view. It offers no specific metaphysical or epistemological doctrine
beyond what is implied by the political conception itself. As an account of
political values, a freestanding political conception does not deny there being other values that apply, say, to the personal, the familial, and the associational; nor does it say that political values are separate from, or
discontinuous with, other values. In this case, citizens themselves, within the
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pursuit of varying conceptions of the public good. Consequently,
what is right or just, from a necessarily limited political perspective, is
prior to and constrains any particular conception of the moral good. 99
This final point is essential to understanding how Professor Rawls's
conception of the person and the person's relationship to the state
plays out in substantive due process jurisprudence. For Professor
Rawls there is a clear split between what is good for the person (the
proper subject of comprehensive moral philosophy) and what it is acceptable for the state to do to enforce any particular conception of the
good (the subject of legitimate political philosophy). 100 The only particular conception of the good which the state may enforce is one
shared by free and equal citizens and which does not presuppose any
particular comprehensive conception of the good life as such.' 0 ' The
state, in order to be just, must accept what is right, the good
notwithstanding.
2.

Rawls and Compassion in Dying

It is easy to see in Professor Rawls's conception of political liberalism the seeds of the Compassion in Dying holding, as well as of
Judge Reinhardt's reading of the entire scope of substantive due process jurisprudence. At its heart, Compassion in Dying is concerned
with securing a sphere of decision making about fundamental moral
questions where individuals are free to choose the good for themselves, unencumbered by the state. The decision, like Professor
Rawls's conception of justice, sets restrictions on the grounds for
political decisions. Political decisions must not be justified solely on
collective conceptions of the good.'0 2 Rather, deciding the good is an
individual choice wherein the state has a very limited place. If the
state decides to restrict a practice which has its roots in some moral,
philosophical, or religious conception of the good, the state must justify its restriction based on some compelling interest other than the
majority's conception of the good. In short, the state must be neutral
exercise of their liberty of thought and conscience, and looking to their comprehensive doctrines, view the political conception as derived from, or congruent with, or at least not in conflict with, their other values.
Id.; see also Fleming, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution, supra note 29, at 284
(noting that "Rawls offers justice as fairness as an example of a political liberalism or
a political conception of justice, as distinguished from a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral conception of the good").
99. Fleming, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution, supra note 29, at 285.
100. Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 174-76.
101. Id. at 224. "This means that in discussing constitutional essentials and matters
of basic justice we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical
doctrines . .. ." Id. at 224-25.
102. See Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 157-72 (1993) [hereinafter Dworkin,
Life's Dominion].
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with regard to judging
the moral worth, or ends, that a particular prac10 3
tice promotes.
C. Problems with the Politics that the Liberal
Anthropology Espouses

This section identifies the internal contradictions that liberalism
must overcome if it is to remain a coherent ground for constitutional
interpretation. Many political philosophers and constitutional theorists, notably Michael Sandel, have criticized the Rawlsian conception
of both the human person and the politics which that conception entails." 4 The first challenge that Professor Sandel levels against Professor Rawls is the plausibility of the self-conception that liberalism
requires. 0 5 Professor Sandel maintains that the liberal vision of the
person cannot make sense of our moral experience because it fails to
account for commonly recognized moral obligations.'0 6 This raises
the question of whether individuals have any duties antecedent to
ones that they choose. 7
Professor Raws would argue that all our moral obligations are a
matter of choice.' 08 This of course turns the classically conceived
political/moral project' °9 on its head. No longer is the goal of politics
to conform the self to the good. Rather, respect for the self is prior to
103. For example, Judge Reinhardt, in Compassion in Dying, cites the Casey decision for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment has at its heart the liberty to
"define one's own concept of existence, of meaning." Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 813 (9th Cir.) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37
(1996). He continues by discussing the misery that terminally ill patients suffer in the
period before death. l at 814. He does not argue whether it is good to allow these
people to hasten their own deaths; indeed this type of argument is not available to a
Rawlsian liberal because the Rawlsian scheme requires that the state be neutral toward questions of morality. Rather, Judge Reinhardt makes an argument about the
limits of state action with respect to this practice, concluding that the state may not
infringe upon this type of intimate choice. Id.
104. See Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind 25-26 (1987) (noting that
all modem students are relativists and that this belief is pre-rational); MacIntyre, After Virtue, supra note 84, at 2 (arguing that modem moral philosophy is in a state of
grave disorder); Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 13-24 (critiquing
predominant modem versions of liberalism); Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the
Limits of Justice (1982); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self The Making of the Modem Identity 520 (1989) (arguing that adopting a secular outlook stifles deep human
aspirations); Michael J. Sandel, The ProceduralRepublic and the Unencumbered Self,
12 Pol. Theory 81, 82 (1984) (discussing the failure of Rawlsian liberalism).
105. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 13.
106. The liberal vision, for example, fails to account for solidarity, religious duties,
and moral obligations that claim us for reasons unrelated to choice. Id.
107. See Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1765, 1768
(1993) (book review).
108. Id. at 1769 (noting that "[t]o base rights on some conception of the good would
impose on some the values of others and so fail to respect each person's capacity to
choose his or her own ends").
109. See supra note 80 (discussing classical political theory).
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the ends which are affirmed by it. Professor Sandel counters that this
liberal project "fails to capture" loyalties and responsibilities whose
moral force does not flow from individual choice but rather flows
from the fact that living by them constitutes our self-understanding."'
A less ambitious version of liberalism,"' minimalist liberalism, argues that even if the liberal anthropology outlined above is fundamentally flawed, it does not follow that governments should cultivate
particular virtues or abandon their commitment of neutrality toward
ends." 2 This argument insists that in the public realm we should
"bracket""' our individual moral commitments, given the fact that
reasonable people differ about conceptions of the good. Therefore,
questions about what political justice requires should be decided apart
from moral obligations and commitments." 4
Professor Sandel proffers a two-fold critique of this version of liberalism." 5 The first criticism involves a ranking of values problem.
Rawlsian liberalism prohibits the state from enforcing" 6 any value
that is derivable solely from a comprehensive conception of the good
life. 1 17 If it can be shown, however, that a value is morally correct,
there is no good reason to tolerate not promoting and protecting it.
Therefore, to accept minimalist liberalism, one would have to show
that other values cannot be true in order to show that toleration of
competing comprehensive conceptions of the good life is the preeminent political value." 8 This is not a minimalist claim at all. It is a
comprehensive denial of the moral truth of certain doctrines. Such an
exercise forces us to engage in just the type of metaphysical virtue
ranking that minimalist liberalism seeks to avoid because it requires a
denial of the possibility that other values, those based on comprehensive conceptions of the good life, could be true. 119
110. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 14. These loyalties include
membership in families, cities, nations, and tribes. Id.
111. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (discussing Rawls's most recent
work on the concept of justice).
112. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 17-19; see supra notes 94101 and accompanying text (discussing Rawls's recent retreat from a comprehensive
liberalism as the ground for our public political philosophy).
113. Bracketing, for purposes of this Note, refers to the method of constitutional
interpretation which asserts that comprehensive and controversial moral and religious
conceptions cannot be used to justify governmental actions. See Michael J. Sandel,
Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 Cal. L.
Rev. 521, 521 (1989) [hereinafter Sandel, MoralArgument and Liberal Toleration].

114. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 9.
115. See Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 19-24.
116. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
117. Professor Rawls argues that there are certain "political" virtues which promote these goals. He argues that it is acceptable, indeed it is imperative, that the state
promote these virtues because they "characterize the ideal of a good citizen of a democratic state." Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 46, at 194-95.
118. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 19.
119. Id.
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Second, when dealing with serious moral controversies, it may not
be possible to discuss the value of toleration apart from a discussion of
the morality of the practice being tolerated. To decide to bracket
questions about the morality of slavery or the personhood of the fetus
in the context of abortion is to come to a moral decision on those
questions. 2 ° If one accepts the practices of holding human beings in
bondage or terminating the life of fetuses as legally permissible, one
has necessarily come to a judgment about the moral character of the
practice in question. Anyone who finds these practices truly morally
reprehensible could never tolerate legally protecting them.
Liberal theories of constitutional interpretation must answer these
challenges if we are to continue "bracketing" moral argument in constitutional adjudication. The remainder of this Note argues that liberal attempts to overcome these challenges have been largely
unsuccessful and are responsible for the current illegitimacy of constitutional adjudication.
III. ORIGINALIST AND PROGRESSIVE ATTEMPTs AT LEGITIMACY

Having looked at the basic aspirational arguments in favor of an
expansive reading of the substantive liberties protected by the Due
Process Clause, this part discusses the traditional critiques of that jurisprudence. This part first explores the originalist answer to aspirationalism and shows how the debates between these two theories of
interpretation are really debates within the liberal philosophical tradition.' 2 ' As a result, neither the aspirational nor the originalist method
is successful in securing political legitimacy for substantive due process rights. This part then discusses progressive constitutional theory
as an alternative to aspirationalism and originalism. Although progressivism comes closer than its competitors to securing political legitimacy, it too eventually fails because, like aspirationalism and
originalism, progressivism accepts the basic liberal philosophical
presuppositions concerning human autonomy and the necessity of
governmental neutrality toward conceptions of the good.
A. The OriginalistResponse to AspirationalJurisprudence
This section discusses the countermajoritarian difficulty inherent in
the practice of judicial review. It then explores the way in which aspirational jurisprudence exacerbates this problem and outlines the
originalist response to aspirationalism. Finally, this section argues
that aspirationalism and originalism both fail to secure legitimacy in
constitutional interpretation because they share the same basic liberal
120. Id&at 20; see also Michael J. Sandel, The Hard Questions: Last Rights, New
Republic, Apr. 14, 1997, at 27 (arguing that those who argue for governmental neutrality really advocate a particular vision of "what makes life worth living").
121. See supra note 31.
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interpretive commitments which ultimately discount the role of moral
experience in deciding constitutional questions.
1. The Traditional Critique of Aspirational Jurisprudence and the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty
Judge Reinhardt's opinion in Compassion in Dying reflects a theory
of interpretation that views the Constitution as a document that lays
down general, comprehensive moral principles that government must
respect. 122 The principle of judicial review under this model requires
judges to decide when the majority has violated these abstract moral
principles in particular circumstances. 2 3 Judges will be activist in the
sense that they must continually determine what "the best, most
2 4 accurate understanding of liberty and equal citizenship" requires.
Judicial review poses a basic political quandary, however, because it
is countermajoritarian.'2 The Court attempts to exercise control in
opposition to the currently prevailing majority.'2 6 The practice of judicial review can avoid condemnation under democratic theory only if
one accepts the "dualist" nature of constitutional democracies. 2 7 The
will of "We the People" expressed in the Constitution is superior to
the will of the legislature expressed in ordinary law. 128 When the
Court relies on this justification to vindicate rights that are not readily
traceable to the language or structure of the Constitution, as the aspirational approach often does because of its commitment to an evolving conception of what the constitutional tradition requires, the
122. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 138 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that time-bound legal concepts do not have the final word about what the
Constitution means); Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 102, at 119 (arguing that
we have created "a constitution of principle that lays down general, comprehensive
standards that government must respect"); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution
of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,27 S. Tex. L.J. 433, 436 (arguing that
"it is the very purpose of our Constitution ... to declare certain values transcendent,
beyond the reach of temporary political majorities").
123. See Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 102, at 119.
124. Id.
125. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 19 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch]. Bickel argues that
[N]othing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it be denied that
the policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the electoral
process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system. Judicial review
works counter to this characteristic.
Id.
126. See id. at 16-17.
127. See Bruce Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 Yale L.J.
453, 464 (1989) (discussing the notion that the function of judicial review is to vindicate the judgments of the entire citizenry against momentary departures by political
elites).
128. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch, supra note 125, at 16.
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legitimacy problem resurfaces. 9 This countermajoritarian problem
has led to the rise of the originalist school of constitutional interpretation. This school argues that courts should only consider the original
understanding of the Framers in determining
whether a statute vio130
lates the dictates of the constitution.
2. Liberal Presuppositions Inherent in Originalist Jurisprudence
Both originalism and aspirationalism rely on basic liberal philosophical presuppositions about the nature of the human person and
the human person's relationship to the law.131 The originalists argue
that their method of constitutional interpretation is far less
countermajoritarian than the aspirational method because it is far
more deferential to legislative action. The starting point of originalist
inquiry is the substantive intent of the Framers; therefore, originalists
limit their interpretive expansion of the textual language to the most
specific level of generality politically possible. 132 This method of constitutional interpretation ensures that the sphere of individual rights
129. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional
law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.").
130. See Antonin Scalia, Originalisnv The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cinn. L Rev. 849, 862
(1989) (arguing that originalism's difficulties are not as severe as other methods of
constitutional interpretation). See generally Bork, The Tempting of America, supra
note 1 (arguing for fidelity to the original understanding of the Framers). Professor
Ronald Dworkin, the champion of the aspirationalists, rejects the idea that the broad
provisions of the Constitution were intended to be limited by the original substantive
understanding of the Framers. Professor Dworkin argues that a faithful reading of
the language requires the interpreter to reject the originalist's Constitution of detail.
The original drafters and ratifiers, who had very detailed convictions, did not choose
to enshrine these convictions in the text. Rather, they opted for broad language of
principle which captured their aspirations rather than their limited substantive commitments. See Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 102, at 137-38. If Professor
Dworkin's critique of originalism is persuasive, it might indicate a realization on the
part of the Framers that it would be unwise to tie the legal hands of future generations
too tightly. Originalists might have an optimism about the Framers' ability to solve
problems of textual indeterminacy and capture complex principles of government
within clear written provisions that the Framers themselves did not share. Adaptation
to changing circumstances and attitudes by future generations is essential to good
government. Originalism's commitment to rigid and formal rules of decision determined a prioriprevents this type of adaptation. See Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism Burkean PoliticalTheory and ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 N.C. L Rev.
619, 667-68 (1994). Originalism, in the sense that its commitment to rigid a priori
rules forecloses appeal to substantive moral debate, either at the legislative or judicial
level, contributes to the crisis of legitimacy.
131. One of the main objectives of this Note is to show that the debate between the
two schools is largely a debate within liberalism, see Young, supra note 130, at 662,
and that this shared commitment to a liberal vision of the person is responsible for the
current crisis of legitimacy in substantive due process jurisprudence.
132. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 148-49 n.7 (1989) (plurality
opinion).
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will not expand uncontrollably, leaving legislatures free to regulate in
the broad area of unprotected conduct.
One of the fundamental problems with originalist theory is that,
although it might secure democratic legitimacy in the sense that it
would almost always allow numerical legislative majorities to have
their way, it does not adequately address the problem of legitimacy,
understood, as this piece has previously defined it, as judging governmental action against some shared conception of what is good.133 The
Framers were certainly aware of the possibility of tyranny of the majority. 34 It is quite possible, in the heat of the political moment, for
majorities to pass legislation that violates the shared conception of
what actions government may justly undertake. In this sense,
majoritarian action, though perfectly democratic, is illegitimate.
Of course, originalists would argue that the actual text of the Constitution is the only limit on legitimate democratic action. 135 The
originalists, however, must now answer the aspirational critique of
their mode of textual analysis: that the originalists have no principled
way of pinning down the level of generality
at which they read the
36
broad language of the Constitution.
133. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
134. "When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government...
enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the
rights of other citizens." The Federalist No. 10, at 45-46 (James Madison) (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 1990). Commentators like Alexander Bickel have
argued persuasively that it is to protect against this fear and to vindicate lasting values, as opposed to transient majoritarian impulses, that the countermajoritarian practice of judicial review was included in the constitutional scheme. Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch, supra note 125, at 24-26.
135. Judge Bork, for example, argues that "in wide areas of life majorities are entitled to rule for no better reason [than] that they are majorities." Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 2 (1971)
[hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles];see generally Young, supra note 130, at 627-37
(1994) (discussing various originalist theorists and their views on the proper method
of constitutional interpretation and the role of judicial review in a democratic
society).
136. Professor Dworkin argues that originalism offers no cogent theory for deciding
at which level of abstraction, other than the judge's own moral conviction, the broad
language of the constitution is to be read. For example, Professor Dworkin asks how
a judge is to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. On its
face the Clause admits of at least four possible interpretations:
a. The Clause prevents all cases of discrimination against blacks that the authors specifically intended to condemn.
b. The Clause forbids all serious discrimination against blacks, but only
blacks.
c. The Clause forbids all serious racial discrimination.
d. The Clause establishes a general principle of equality that applies to all
Americans.
Once a judge abandons the first reading-which she must do if she is to accept Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), because the Congress that ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment also segregated the Washington, D.C. public schools-she
"has no other means of checking the abstract language. [She] is in a kind of free-fall,
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In support of this argument, Professor Dworkin charges that
originalist judges do not simply interpret the text but interpret it in
light of their own personal values. 3 7 Among the values that a judge
brings to the interpretation of the constitutional text is a conception of
the human person. 138 A review of the opinions of Justice Scalia, for
example, reveals that originalist judges, 139 no less than their aspirational colleagues, have enshrined a liberal conception of the human
person at the
heart of their approach to constitutional
140
interpretation.
in which originalism can mean anything and the only check on [her] judgment is [her]
own political instinct." Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 102, at 139-43.
137. Professor Dworkin cites Judge Bork for the notion that all judges, whether
they are originalist or aspirationalist, must "interpret [the Constitution], as best they
can, according to their own lights." Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 102, at 142.
138. As Judge Bork himself has said, "There is no principled way to decide that one
man's gratifications are more deserving of respect than another's ....There is no
way of deciding these matters other than by reference to some moral or ethical values
that has no objective or intrinsic validity... ." Bork, Neutral Principles,supra note
135, at 10.
139. Commentators have suggested that Judge Bork's writings also reveal this liberal conception of the person. He has argued that "judges must be pure relativists,
remaining morally indifferent and inactive until required to implement whatever values legislatures or constitutions generate ... ." James G. Wilson, Justice Difjitsed: A
Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservatism with the Wiews of Five Conservative,
Academic Judges, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 913, 944 (1986). There are no limits that
courts may impose on democratic government absent some clear textual warrant, so
that, for example, prior to the Thirteenth Amendment's ratification, slavery was perfectly legal. See id at 946. This Note argues that technical legality is not enough to
vindicate a law's legitimacy. The law must, in some way, comport with the people's
shared conception of what is right in order to be legitimate. Slavery is perhaps the
best example of this position. Thousands fought and died to abolish the practice despite its apparent textual legality.
140. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of Character: The Moral
Agendas of Justices O'Connor,Scalia and Kennedy, 49 Rutgers L Rev. 219, 233-35
(1996). Professor Gottlieb argues that Justice Scalia is not consistently devoted to a
strict interpretation of the text of the Constitution. Id at 233. For Justice Scalia, virtue is superfluous to the judicial process. Id. at 234. Therefore, Justice Scalia does not
respect politics, because politics, especially in its democratic form, allows life's losers
(democratic majorities), in the name of some supposed good, to overcome life's winners who succeed by following the neutral rules. Id at 235. This faith in neutrality is
what makes Justice Scalia a liberal, in the sense that the outcomes that his decisions
engender are not justified against a conception of the good. Hence, his decisions, like
Judge Reinhardt's, fail to appeal to any moral consensus and therefore lack legitimacy. Appeal to moral argument would be fruitless before Justice Scalia; all that
matters to him is that neutral rules, which do not respect persons or outcomes, be
applied regardless of the consequences. Id at 234; see eg., Schlup v. Delo, 115 S.Ct.
851, 874-75 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that consideration of evidence of
death row inmate's innocence was foreclosed); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
115 S.CL 2097, 2118-19 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (applying strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action program); Herrera v. CoUins, 506 U.S. 390, 428 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (arguing that no constitutional basis exists to consider new evidence
after conviction); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-79 (1990) (holding, in
Justice Scalia's majority opinion, that neutral laws prohibiting drug use foreclose free
exercise claim to the use of peyote at Native American religious ceremony); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 524-25 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
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Hence, Justice Scalia is perfectly willing, in his concurrence in
Cruzan,4 1 to leave the question of whether a terminally ill patient has
a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment to the citizens of Missouri. 142 Whatever rule the citizens decide upon, as long as it is applied neutrally, is constitutionally acceptable. 143 This solution,
however, does not adequately address the issue, essential to the question of legitimacy, of what happens if the majority adopts a rule which
fails to comport with the polity's conception of justice. Nor does it
provide any guidance as to how political deliberation should proceed
concerning the nature of that conception of justice. To the extent that
originalist jurisprudence in the physician-assisted suicide context will
mirror Justice Scalia's argument in Cruzan, an originalist answer to
the question proposed by Compassion in Dying will not secure legitimacy for the substance of that decision, whatever it may be.
Both the aspirational and originalist sides of this debate assume that
the legitimacy problem of judicial vindication of constitutional rights
lies in a flawed interpretation of the constitutional text itself or in how
judges should go about interpreting it. 44 Each side fails to recognize
that it is the lack of ends-focused justification for constitutional rights,
not questions about the proper role of the judiciary or interpretive
methods, that has led to the present crisis of constitutional legitimacy.
Finally, until some acceptable form of moral argument, which does
justice to the human person as a fundamentally moral agent, works its
(agreeing that municipality's affirmative action program was void and urging that only
actual prior discrimination justified remedial state action). The common thread running through these opinions is a celebration of neutrality. Justice Scalia believes that
all that is required for legitimacy is a neutral application of a law, no matter how
unjust. Moral argument, either before the judiciary (by Native Americans who feel
that neutral drug laws do not trump their individual moral commitment to their religion) or the legislature (in the sense that affirmative action programs are passed to
correct a past and ongoing moral wrong) cannot overcome Justice Scalia's firm commitment to neutrality.
141. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
142. Id. at 293.
143. Id. at 300 (noting that the Equal Protection Clause requires the democratic
majority to submit to whatever rules they establish for the minority).
144. Professor Robin West has persuasively demonstrated this point. See Robin
West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 441, 442-46, 444-45 nn.10 & 11 (1992)
[hereinafter West, Reconstructing Liberty]. Professor West discusses the concept of
ordered liberty articulated by Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman, see supra note 72, and
identifies the central idea behind Justice Harlan's jurisprudence to be that no state
goal can justify state infringement on these essential liberties. Id. at 443. She then
criticizes this conception of "ordered liberty" as too constricted. Id. at 444. The
problems of originalist substantive due process jurisprudence according to Professor
West are similar to the problems of aspirational jurisprudence. They differ in degree
but not in kind. Originalists also want to protect a sphere of ordered liberty, but they
conceive of this sphere of liberty much more narrowly than the aspirationalists. Id. at
444-45. Professor West argues that the challenge of constitutional interpretation is to
go beyond both constricting notions of liberty to a more expansive and progressive
conception. Id at 445.
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way into constitutional adjudication, there will be no possible way of
securing anything resembling political agreement on divisive moral issues like physician-assisted suicide.
B.

ProgressiveAttempts at Legitimacy

The foregoing discussion shows that both aspirationalism and
originalism fail to secure legitimacy for constitutional decisions
grounded on substantive due process principles. This section explores
the progressive alternative and concludes that, like aspirationalism
and originalism, progressive theory also fails to secure legitimacy in
constitutional adjudication.
1. Cass Sunstein and the Beginnings of a Morality-Regarding
Politics
Progressive constitutional theory 4 ' tries to overcome the liberal
presuppositions inherent in the originalist and aspirational methods of
constitutional interpretation." 4 This theory attempts to avoid the
charge that the originalists frequently level at substantive due process
cases like Roe, Casey, and Compassion in Dying. Originalists claim
that, in these cases, the Court engaged in Lochnering,' 4 that is, the
148
Justices made the same mistake as they did in Lochner v. New York
by enshrining their own values in the Constitution without any textual
145. See generally Robin West, Progressiveand Conservative Constitutionalism, 88
Mich. L. Rev. 641 (1990) (contrasting progressive constitutional theory with conservative theories of constitutional interpretation). "Progressive constitutionalists ... view
the power and normative authority of some social groups over others as the fruits of
illegitimate private hierarchy, and regard the Constitution as one important mechanism for challenging those entrenched private orders." Id. at 643. Essentially, progressivism is concerned with power and its distribution. They see the current
distribution of power in our society as illegitimate and are concerned with finding
ways of using state power, either through the legislative, executive, or judicial
branches, to overturn those illegitimate power structures. Id. at 644. They also argue
that the liberal project of neutrality is illusory and that it is impossible to derive favored outcomes from neutral principles. Id. Progressives maintain, therefore, that all
governmental actions, including judicial ones, are "necessarily political-and hence
necessarily grounded in some normative conception of the good." Id. Progressives
view the fault line of modem constitutional theory being drawn between those who
see the Constitution as "a vehicle to preserve existing social and private orderings
against majoritarian political change" and those who see it as "a way as to facilitate
continuous, inventive challenges to the dominant private and social order." Id. at 645;
see also Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, supra note 144, at 443-53 (criticizing the
protection of only negative liberties in constitutional interpretation). For an interesting discussion of the progressive vision of democratic culture, see J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 Yale LJ. 1935, 1948 (1995)
(book review). Professor Balkin notes that "[flor progressives, democratic culture is a
culture in which the progressive ideal of democracy can flourish. It is a culture in
which people engage in rational deliberation about important public issues .... " Id.
146. See supra note 144.
147. See Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, supra note 29, at 212.
148. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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or structural warrant.'4 9 Progressive theories, in the name of democracy, strive to end the judicial bickering about which rights are protected and seek instead a more legitimate rendering of what type of
political scheme our Constitution creates.
a. Outline of the Liberal Republic
Cass Sunstein, a noted progressive, sees our constitutional system as
a deliberative democracy, 150 or alternatively, as a liberal republic. 15'
Professor Sunstein attempts to recapture a republican tradition, which
he traces to the Founding, that conceives of civic virtue as indispensable to free government. 5 According to Professor Sunstein, the goal
of the Framers was to create a system that would ensure a virtuous
politics but which at the same time would not indulge unrealistic assumptions about human nature. 53
To understand how Professor Sunstein sees our constitutional system operating, one must look at his criticism of the Supreme Court's
Lochner decision. 154 Lochner was wrong according to Professor Sunstein because it took a pre-existing power distribution, namely the rel149. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 797 n.5 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that "[w]hile constitutional
adjudication involves judgments of value, it remains the case that some values are
indeed 'extraconstitutional,' in that they have no roots in the Constitution that the
people have chosen. The Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), was wrong because it rested on... an assessment of value that was unsupported by the Constitution"); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, supra note 1, at 927
(noting that some interpreters are not troubled by the fact that nothing in the Constitution refers to certain due process rights, like abortion).
150. See Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 29, at 133.
151. Id at 21, 24-25. For Professor Sunstein, the American polity, as the Framers
conceived it, was to combine the most favorable aspects of both the classical and
modem traditions of political philosophy. The Framers carried on the classical idea
that the goal of government is to educate the citizens in what is good. Id. at 21. The
Framers also wanted, however, to enshrine an anti-authoritarian principle in their
mode of government. For this they turned to the Enlightenment notion that what is
good could be justified on the basis of public-regarding reasons accessible to all rational citizens. Id at 24.
152. ld at 20. Civic virtue is defined as "a commitment to the general good rather
than to self-interest or the interest of private factions." Id. at 21.
153. Id at 20-21.
154. At issue in Lochner was a New York statute which prevented any employee of
a baking establishment from working more than sixty hours per week. Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 46 (1905). Justice Peckham, writing for the Court, held that
liberty of contract is part of the liberty contemplated by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 53. The question therefore, was whether the state,
in a proper exercise of its police powers, could limit this liberty. The Court held that a
limitation on personal liberty was improper in this case. Id at 58. Justice Holmes in a
blistering dissent argued that the state's exercise of police power in this context was
completely legitimate:
The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere
with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for
some well-known writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for pur-
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ative bargaining positions of bakers and their employers, which
common and statutory law had created, and rendered this power distribution constitutionally sacrosanct.155 The Court mischaracterized
the statute at issue in Lochner as an impermissible governmental intervention into a voluntary and law-free private sphere.15 Rather, the
New York legislature quite properly tried, by regulating the hours of
bakers, to alter the existing, law-created, and unequal bargaining positions of the respective parties in the name of the public good. " This
intervention, according to Professor Sunstein, was a completely acceptable legislative function because the constitutional document creates and 158
protects a system where the common good can be politically
realized.
Judicial review in the liberal republic is more limited than under an
aspirational model or in originalist judicial practice. 59 Courts should
act only to secure the preconditions of deliberative democracy. To
this end, courts should limit themselves to policing the preconditions
for political deliberation 160 and to protecting those who are unable to
receive a fair hearing in the political arena. 161 This is not the entire
poses thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
Id- at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
155. Professor Sunstein argues, "In all likelihood, the Court thought that the illegitimate motive actually at work was the impermissible redistributive one: to transfer
resources from employers to employees." Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra
note 29, at 47.
156. Id. at 50.
157. The majority in Lochner assumed that neutrality was what the Due Process
Clause commanded. The only way the statute could be saved would be to defend the
law as necessary to preserve public health, for only then could it qualify as neutral.
The law at issue, according to the Court, could not be justified in this way because it
was not neutral. The law was simply a naked exercise of political power by one
group-employees-over another-employers. What the Court in Lochner never
considered, however, and this is where it went wrong, was that the existing power
distribution itself was not, and never had been, neutral. The law, in fact, attempted to
neutralize an inherently unequal, law-created power structure. See hL at 47-48.
158. Id at 20. Such a system, according to Professor Sunstein, needs certain basic
commitments in order to sustain it. The central governmental requirement in the
liberal republic is respect for an "impartiality principle." Il at 17. Majoritarian political power is not self-validating. flt at 29. The government must always provide public-regarding reasons for its actions. Professor Sunstein imagines a system where
"outcomes are justified by reference not to raw political power, but to some public
value that they can be said to serve." Id. at 27. This impartiality principle is achieved
through four core commitments. I at 134-41. First, political decisions should be the
result of discussion about the common good. Second, this deliberation must be the
product of widespread political participation by a citizenry committed to the common
good. Third, agreement on public matters should be the goal of politics in the liberal
republic. Finally, there must be political equality. Large disparities in political influence among different individuals and social groups is unacceptable. Id
159. Id. at 140.
160. Id at 144.
161. Id.; see also Ely, Democracy and Distrust, supra note 3, at 73-179 (arguing
that courts should limit themselves to keeping the political process open).
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scope of the constitutional mandate to government, however. Indeed,
it is precisely when the Court ties the hands of the political branches
on constitutional grounds when the above situations are not present
that the Court comes closest to illegitimacy. 62 Securing the four core
commitments 163 of deliberative democracy requires positive action by
the political branches that goes beyond the power of the judiciary.
Professor Sunstein thus has a strong sense of the Constitution outside
the courts.' 64
b.

Why Deliberative Democracy Is a Beginning for Securing
Legitimacy in ConstitutionalAdjudication

Professor Sunstein's main contribution to the goal of securing legitimacy for constitutional interpretation is his recognition of a publicregarding end to politics. This realization restores the notion, integral
to the political craft, that politics is a community building endeavor.
The liberal conception of the person, and the mode of constitutional
interpretation which enshrines it, has precipitated a retreat from pub1 65
lic spaces to a concern only for the individual's private sphere.
Such a politics makes the construction of a community nearly impossible, leaving 166human beings feeling alone, disempowered, and
discontented.
Professor Sunstein's limited role for judicial review, coupled with
his republican commitment to public deliberation by a committed citizenry, allows participants in our democracy to argue about the justice
and the good in their respective positions. Deliberative democracy
calls on us to make moral arguments about why a specific policy
should be permitted or prohibited. This, in turn, reinforces the sense
that we are truly self-governing agents, not mere creatures who rely
on a shifting judiciary to protect the few rights we have from an encroaching leviathan state. Decisions which are the result of this type
162. Good examples of judicial overreaching are apparent in the Court's Lochner
decision, see supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text, and in its treatment of campaign finance reform in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See Sunstein, The Partial
Constitution, supra note 29, at 84-85.
163. See supra note 158.
164. For example, Professor Sunstein discusses San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), where the Court refused to strike down San
Antonio's school financing mechanism based on property taxes which produced large
disparities in funds between rich and poor districts on equal protection grounds. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 29, at 140. Without really discussing
whether or not the case was rightly decided, Professor Sunstein argues that, even if
equal educational financing is not a judicially enforceable constitutional mandate, this
does not resolve the question of whether the political branches have a constitutional
obligation to promote that goal. Id.; see also Fleming, Constructing the Substantive
Constitution, supra note 29, at 244 (noting that Sunstein stresses the idea that the
judicially enforceable Constitution is not coterminous with the Constitution that binds
the political branches).
165. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 331.
166. See id. at 3-4.
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of spirited1 67political debate are far more likely to be regarded as
legitimate.

2. Professor Sunstein's Lack of Commitment to a True MoralityRegarding Politics
Despite Professor Sunstein's contributions to establishing meaningful moral and political dialogue in the context of identifying substantive due process rights, this subsection argues that Professor
Sunstein's liberal republic also fails to secure legitimacy in constitutional interpretation because it shares the basic liberal anthropological
presuppositions of the aspirational and originalist schools. 16 Professor Sunstein, rather than advocating a strong republicanism, attempts,
as the name liberal republicanism suggests, to synthesize the liberal
and republican strands within the American constitutional tradition. 169 In fact, his theory of "public-regarding" reasons implies an acceptance of the Enlightenment goal of honoring in the public sphere
only those moral commitments that appeal to a universal
rationalism. 70
For instance, Professor Sunstein, like Professor Rawls, argues that
deep religious and moral commitments should be removed from political debate as a prerequisite to republican deliberation.171 The impossibility of high-level moral agreement, in Professor Sunstein's
conception, forces him to accept the Rawlsian/liberal/autonomous vision of the person as a precondition to deliberative democracy. 72
167. See generally James B. Thayer, The Originand Scope of the American Doctrine
of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893) (arguing that a strong theory of
judicial review cheapens democracy).
168. See supra part HI.A.2.
169. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, supra note 29, at 249-50.
170. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution, supra note 29, at 24.
171. Fleming, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution,supra note 29, at 256.
172. Ik at 259. For example, Professor Sunstein contrasts his view that liberal constitutionalism is neutral "as among different possible human natures" with the view
that liberal republicanism actually corresponds to human nature. Sunstein, The Partial
Constitution, supra note 29, at 141. He argues that his vision does not require government to attempt a revision of human character, such efforts, he feels, "are usually
doomed to failure, and often they end up in tyranny." Id. Rather, he defends his
conception of liberal constitutionalism on the ground that such a conception has
healthy effects on the human character. "Democracy," argues Professor Sunstein,
"tends to inculcate valuable characteristics in human beings." Id. (citing John Stuart
Mill and John Rawls for support).
In another time and place, those "valuable characteristics" would have been called
virtues. See Gertrude Himmelfarb, The De-Moralization of Society 3-18 (1994) (discussing how our language has changed the way we think about the concept of virtue).
Professor Sunstein, however, offers no principled account of why "characteristics" associated with peculiarly religious or moral traditions do not develop the type of character necessary to be a member of a democratic society. The only justification for this
omission would be a showing that peculiarly religious convictions do not develop
those characteristics. Such a showing, however, would require an engagement of religious argument in the public square, with the attendant possibility that those advocat-
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Professor Sunstein's attempted synthesis brings the inquiry full circle.
We are left with a liberal conception of the person as the baseline for
constitutional decision, with all of the problems such a conception entails. As with Professor Rawls, Professor Sunstein does not offer a
convincing rebuttal to the charge that "bracketing" moral controversies for political purposes often requires passing judgment on the morality of the practice in question. 173 Moreover, Professor Sunstein
fails to secure the autonomy rights essential to the liberal conception
of justice due to his relatively weak theory of judicial review. 174 In
short, Professor Sunstein leaves us with a weak republicanism, that
fails to take seriously the place of moral argument in political life, and
weak liberalism, that provides few devices to protect the autonomy
that is central to liberalism's political culture.
IV.

MICHAEL SANDEL: A STRONG REPUBLICAN CONCEPTION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

While offering a fundamental starting point for an inquiry into the
legitimacy of substantive due process rights, Professor Sunstein's synthesis ultimately fails because he neglects his own essential insight toward the creation of legitimacy in constitutional interpretation. When
constitutional decision makers debate the permissibility of a practice,
they must inquire whether the practice promotes or retards the proper
functioning of our type of republican government. If the government
promotes the necessary virtues in the citizenry, they will be able to
adequately shape, in the context of public discourse, a vision of the
human good as such. Republican theory requires, of all governmental
actors, but especially of judges, a type of ends-focused practical
reasoning.
This part sets forth the basics of Michael Sandel's strong republican
theory. It discusses what Professor Sandel sees as the core commitments necessary to secure the proper functioning of a republican regime. This part then discusses how these commitments have been
undermined by the turn in substantive due process jurisprudence from
its initial grounding in the beneficial societal institution of marriage in
Griswold v. Connecticut 7 5 toward a grounding in the problematic liberal conception of the human person discussed in the previous parts of
this Note. Finally, this part considers where Professor Sandel would
ground substantive privacy rights.
ing the religious position might actually win. Professor Sunstein, however, claims that
religious argument should be removed from republican politics. See Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, supra note 29, at 256.

173. See Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 20.
174. See Fleming, Constructingthe Substantive Constitution, supra note 29, at 25659 (arguing that Sunstein's theory of securing deliberative democracy fails to secure
autonomy rights contemplated in due process cases like Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and their progeny).
175. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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A. Outline of ProfessorSandel's Republicanism
This section outlines the basics of Professor Sandel's republican theory. In addition, this section contrasts the republican conception of
the relationship between the individual and the state with that of
liberalism.
Rather than attempt a Sunstein-like synthesis between the competing traditions of liberalism and republicanism, Professor Sandel argues
that the liberal political project has made real constitutional legitimacy impossible. Liberalism has rendered American politics unable
to take the task of community building seriously. 17 6 Consequently,
Professor Sandel advocates scrapping the liberal model of governance
in favor of a republican public philosophy. 77
Like liberalism and progressivism, republicanism possesses certain
core commitments that are essential to the proper and just functioning
of the polity.' 78 First, there is no necessity that government be neutral
toward conceptions of the good.179 Second, government has the
power, indeed the responsibility, to cultivate the virtues in the citizenry necessary to preserve that particular type of government.'11
176. See Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 3-4.
177. See id. at 321-24.
178. Because this Note attempts to use Professor Sandel's mode of political argument as the basis for securing legitimacy in substantive due process jurisprudence, the
foregoing discussion of the commitments of republicanism will largely reflect Professor Sandel's conception. For further discussion of the core commitments of republicanism, see Mark Tushnet, Red, White, and Blue, A Critical Analysis of
Constitutional Law 274 (1988) (discussing the role of religion in the republican tradition); Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. Pa. L
Rev. 801, 834-41 (1993); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J.
1539, 1548-58 (1988) (arguing that republicanism's core commitments are deliberation, political equality, universalism, and citizenship).
179. Republican theory does not interpret rights either in a vacuum or judged
against metaphysical notions of the human person and what is due to it. Rather,
rights are interpreted in light of a particular conception of the good society, i.e., the
self-governing republic. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 25. Republicanism rejects the liberal attempt to define liberty in opposition to government.
In the liberal conception, individual liberty is a constraint on the powers of government. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(noting that in our society "we must be willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or
even repellent practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncrasies"). An individual is free in so far as rights that he possesses insulate his choices
from majority regulation. See Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 26.
In contrast, under the republican conception, an individual is free m so far as she is a
member of a political community that controls its own fate and a participant in the
decisions that govern its affairs. Id. There can be no liberty pursuant to this model
without "self-government and the civic virtues that sustain it." Id.
In a sense, Professor Sandel's conception of republicanism is a minimalist conception. He does not argue that a republic is objectively the best type of government.
Rather, he argues that a republican form is the type of government our Constitution
establishes and that rights, which inevitably protect practices from state interference,
must be referenced to promoting virtue in the citizenry necessary to sustain this type
of polity. kd at 25.
180. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 25.
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Republicans do not believe that respect for self-government, as opposed to self-determination, espoused by liberal theorists, leaves individuals overly susceptible to tyranny of the majority.'"' Republicans
are willing to accept the idea that some form of state sponsored instruction in civic virtue is permissible, and perhaps necessary, for the
preservation of liberty because liberty requires citizens who possess
the virtues necessary for self-government.'
To view citizens primarily as objects of governmental treatment, rather than as full participants in the governing project, is to concede individual dependence
and disempowerment. Such disempowered persons are incapable of
self-government and are therefore vulnerable to loss of liberty. 83
B. Professor Sandel and Substantive Due ProcessJurisprudence
This section examines Professor Sandel's analysis of the Supreme
Court's substantive due process jurisprudence and identifies a few of
the problems for legitimacy that this jurisprudence raises. First, this
section discusses the turn in substantive due process jurisprudence between Griswold v. Connecticut"" and Eisenstadtv. Baird.185 This section then discusses where Professor Sandel would ground substantive
due process rights.
1. The Turn from Griswold to Eisenstadt
Professor Sandel argues that Griswold is not the substantive due
process watershed that many suppose it to be.18 6 At issue in Griswold
was a Connecticut statute banning both the use and the counseling in
the use of contraceptives. 187 Justice Douglas, writing for the Court,
181. Professor Sandel accepts the possibility that tyranny may result in this type of
polity, but "[r]epublican politics is risky politics, a politics without guarantees. And
the risks it entails inhere in the formative project. To accord the political community
a stake in the character of its citizens is to concede the possibility that bad communities may form bad characters." Id. at 321. He also argues that there is no alternative
for the state but to accept the formative project. The liberal conception of the human
person as an unencumbered self does not do justice to the complexity of human duties. The minimalist notion of liberalism does not allow "political deliberation [to
reflect] our best understanding of the highest human ends." Id. at 322. This, of
course, leads to the critique of aspirational jurisprudence that it is a tyranny of the
judiciary. Without accepting Judge Bork's notion that the ground for fundamental
rights can only be the words of the text as the Framers conceived it, his attack on the
tyranny of aspirational jurisprudence is sobering-the "Supreme Court['s] departures
from the original meaning of the Constitution are advocated precisely because those
departures are not correctable democratically. The point of the academic exercise is
to be free of democracy in order to impose the values of an elite upon the rest of us."
Bork, The Tempting of America, supra note 1, at 145.
182. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 26.
183. Id. at 322-23.
184. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
185. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
186. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration, supra note 113, at 527.
187. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
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found that this statute operated "directly on an intimate relation of
husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation.""1s Justice Douglas reasoned that the problem with the statute
was that it had a destructive impact on a relationship which lies in a
zone of privacy created by certain fundamental constitutional guarantees, such as the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments." s Justice
Douglas was repulsed by the idea that police could search the marital
bedroom. 19 0 Hence the Court struck down the statute, holding that it
impermissibly and unconstitutionally intruded upon a quintessentially
private relationship. 19 1
The Griswold right of privacy, according to Professor Sandel, was
not grounded in some notion of human autonomy. The Griswold
Court did not hold that people should be free to choose what type of
sexual life they will lead. Rather, the right was grounded in the notion
that, to protect the social institution of marriage, an institution that
secures human goods essential to the proper functioning of the republic, some measure of reproductive and sexual privacy is necessary.'1
Professor Sandel labels this conception of privacy "old privacy."1 93
For Professor Sandel, the true watershed event in substantive due
process jurisprudence came in Eisenstadt v. Baird.'94 In Eisenstadt,
the Court struck down a statute regulating the sale of contraceptives. 95 This law did not violate old privacy notions because enforcement did96 not require governmental surveillance of intimate
activities.
The Eisenstadt Court departed from the reasoning in Griswold in
two key respects. First, it prescinded the right of privacy from the
social institution of marriage to the individual.197 Second, it shifted
the conception of privacy from its old form to a "new privacy."198 Privacy was no longer conceived of as freedom from surveillance or disclosure of intimate affairs that have a direct effect on an institution
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id at 482.
Id. at 484-86.
Id. at 485-86.
Id. at 485.
Justice Douglas noted in Griswold:

Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes
a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral

loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Id. at 486.

193. Sandel, MoralArgument and Liberal Toleration, supra note 113, at 525-27.
194. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
195. Id. at 454-55.
196. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration, supra note 113, at 527.
197. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453 (noting that "[i]f under Griswold the distribution of
contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible").
198. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration, supra note 113, at 527-28.
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that promotes goods essential to the functioning of the polity. Privacy, after Eisenstadt,is conceived of as protecting the freedom to engage in certain activities, regardless of the ends which they promote,
without governmental restriction. 199
Roe v. Wade,2 °0 the first Supreme Court decision to find that women have a fundamental right to an abortion, reaffirmed the Eisenstadt privacy principle and expanded on it. After Roe, the right of
privacy became the right to make certain choices autonomously, free
of state interference.20 1 Later, the dissenters in Bowers v. Hardwick, 2 in seeking to analogize the sexual choices of heterosexuals
protected in Griswold to the sexual choices of homosexuals, relied
solely on the right of privacy as grounded in an autonomous conception of the human person. 0 3 These later cases demonstrate that the
institutional and ends-focused reasoning of the Griswold Court had
disappeared entirely.
2. Professor Sandel and the Substantive Ground for Privacy Rights
Professor Sandel takes issue with two analogous philosophical assumptions presented by the right of privacy cases after Griswold. The
first assumption is the ambitious one articulated by the dissenters in
Bowers and the majorities in Compassion in Dying and Eisenstadt.
These judges reasoned that persons bear privacy rights as individuals,
prior to their social or political attachments. 0 4 Furthermore, human
199. Eisenstadt emphasized that
the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual,married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.
Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 453.
200. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
201. Justice Blackmun noted:
The right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is,
...
is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State would impose upon
the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.
Id. at 153.
202. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
203. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration, supra note 113, at 530. This
can be seen by noting the language of Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion:
I believe we must analyze respondent Hardwick's claim in the light of the
values that underlie the constitutional right to privacy. If that right means
anything, it means that, before Georgia can prosecute its citizens for making
choices about the most intimate aspects of their lives, it must do more than
assert that the choice they have made is an "abominable crime not fit to be
named among Christians."
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. See Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration, supra note 113, at 527,
534-35.
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dignity itself requires that government respect the individual's intimate choices. 20 5
Professor Sandel criticizes this first assumption in two respects.
First, Professor Sandel argues that grounding judicial protection of the
practices in question on such an assumption does little to secure legitimacy for the decision. It is not clear that social cooperation can be
secured strictly on the basis of autonomy rights without first arriving
at some agreement on the moral permissibility of the practice at issue.20 6 Furthermore, the quality of respect for the practice that autonomous privacy secures is, at best, grudging and fragile." 7 If the choice
to protect the practice does not comport with the community's sense
of what is good, at some level, the community has to support the decision despite itself.
This leads to Professor Sandel's second criticism of grounding privacy rights purely on a liberal conception of the person. Professor
Sandel argues that the goal of those seeking to protect what has historically been considered a morally dubious practice should be to
challenge the prevailing assumption of dubiousness that gave rise to
the legislation prohibiting it.20 8 Only then can true acceptance and
legitimacy be achieved. 20 9
The second philosophical assumption, inherent in the post-Griswold
privacy cases, stems from the minimalist approach taken by the majority in Roe.21 0 As this Note has previously discussed, the minimalist
seeks to bracket all controversial moral and religious issues for the
sake of securing social cooperation.2 ' Professor Sandel objects to this
approach on two grounds. First, the Roe Court claimed to be bracketing the controversial question of when life begins212 but implicitly held
that it began at viability. 213 Otherwise, how could it have accepted
abortion prior to viability without sanctioning murder? Second, Pro205. See id at 524.
206. Id at 536-37.
207. Id at 537.
208. IL Professor Sandel argues that "[t]he problem with the neutral case for toleration is [that] it leaves wholly unchallenged the adverse views of homosexuality
itself. Unless those views can be plausibly addressed, even a Court ruling in their
favor is unlikely to win for homosexuals more than a thin and fragile toleration." Id.
209. Id "The justice or injustice of laws against abortion and homosexual sodomy
may have something to do with the morality or immorality of these practices after
all." Id at 538.
210. Justice Blackmun, in his majority opinion, sought to avoid as best he could the

religious and philosophical controversy inherent in the abortion question. Therefore,
he sought to ground the abortion holding on a medical and historical footing. See Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116-17 (1973).
211. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
212. "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins." Roe, 410 U.S.
at 159.
213. Id. at 164-65 (holding that "[for the stage subsequent to viability, the State in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and
even proscribe, abortion").
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fessor Sandel questions what counts as "bracketing." Do we bracket
these moral issues by returning them to the political branches and letting them decide, or does bracketing involve taking the issue out of
politics altogether and leaving it to individual choice? Professor
Sandel believes that the only way to secure lasting protection for all
these rights and achieve some measure of legitimacy for them is to
argue from the goods which the practices realize. 14
Professor Sandel's theory provides a framework for securing legitimacy for substantive due process jurisprudence on republican
grounds. The final part explores how this legitimacy-securing theory
functions in the context of physician assisted suicide.
V.

MORAL ARGUMENT, LEGITIMACY, AND COMPASSION IN DYING

This final part explores the application of Professor Sandel's reasoning to the question of the constitutionality of the right to physician
assisted suicide in an attempt to render that issue, and substantive due
process jurisprudence generally, politically legitimate. This part begins with a discussion of Professor Ronald Dworkin's attempt to
ground substantive moral agreement on principles of Rawlsian liberalism. This part then discusses why, according to Professor Sandel,
Professor Dworkin's vision of the place of moral argument in our constitutional democracy is too limited and constricted. Next, this part
explores Sandelian arguments both for and against physician assisted
suicide. Professor Sandel, as this Note has previously discussed, is a
strong republican. 1 5 In the republican model of democratic government, state action must be referenced against some conception of the
good life in order for that action to be legitimate. 1 6 By exploring the
moral arguments on both sides of the question it is hoped that political legitimacy can be secured for the judicial resolution of the issue of
physician-assisted suicide, whatever the substantive outcome. Finally,
this part explores Professor Sandel's conception of judicial review and
examines when it may be exercised to secure legitimacy for a constitutional right.
A. Dworkinian Arguments and Compassion in Dying: The
AspirationalAttempt to Take Moral Argument Seriously
Ronald Dworkin, in Life's Dominion, seriously addresses moral arguments concerning questions of life, death, and sexuality. Professor
Dworkin, much like Professor Sandel, argues that attempts to bracket
moral argument about questions of life and death are ultimately futile
because it is impossible for people to compromise about fundamental
214. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration, supra note 113, at 524.
215. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.

216. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
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moral questions.217 Like Professor Sandel, Professor Dworkin admits
that some form of moral agreement is essential before legitimacy in
constitutional interpretation can be secured.21 8 Professor Dworkin ultimately posits that a moral solution to the problems surrounding life
and death issues is possible without
forcing anyone to compromise
2 19
their most fundamental beliefs.

Professor Dworkin finds, in a search for common ground between
conservatives and liberals, that they both agree that life is sacred and
that premature death is always a waste and a shame. 220 They can also
agree that abortion and euthanasia are, at least, always morally problematic. 2 ' But, "people disagree about the best answer to the question of whether avoidable premature death is always or invariably the
most serious possible frustration of life.2' The real philosophical
question at issue in these cases (and one where there is hope for moral
agreement because there is agreement on the starting point-that life
is sacred) is whether the frustration of a biological life, although a
waste, is sometimes justifiable because there is an even greater human
waste if that life is permitted to continue.m
Professor Dworkin, after constructing the moral argument, continues by analyzing the state's role in it. He argues:
[I]n Western political culture... the most important feature of that
culture is a belief in individual human dignity: that people have the
moral right-and the moral responsibility-to confront the most
fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own
lives for themselves,
answering to their own consciences and
224
convictions.
Thus, the real legal question for Professor Dworkin, in both the abortion and physician-assisted suicide cases, is whether the states have a
compelling reason to restrict or prohibit individual autonomous decision making in life or death situations based on a general responsibility to protect the intrinsic value of human life.
Professor Dworkin concedes that the state does have an interest in
protecting the sanctity of life.- 5 The state may effectuate this interest
intwo ways. It may promote the goal of responsibility by requiring
that its citizens treat decisions concerning questions of fundamental
life and death as matters of moral importance, not simply as matters
217. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 102, at 10 (discussing the moral ramifications of the personhood of the fetus).
218. See id.
219. Id. at 10-11.
220. Id. at 84.
221. Id.

222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

90.
94.
166.
150.
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of convenience. 6 Alternatively, the state may try to promote the
goal of conformity and require its citizens to obey majoritarian answers
to the question of how best to protect the intrinsic sanctity of
227
life.

Professor Dworkin argues that human dignity requires government
to take a detached approach to moral decision making on such fundamental questions. 22 Freedom, according to this conception, is defined
as the right to make these decisions for oneself, free from majoritarian
and democratic coercion. As Professor Dworkin puts it, "a constitution that permits a majority to deny freedom of conscience is democracy's enemy, not its author." 9 Professor Dworkin, in the tradition
of the classical liberal project, argues for the right before the good.
Respecting individual autonomy is the only moral choice for democratic government because human dignity, according to Professor
Dworkin, requires it. Professor Dworkin argues that the state is morally and constitutionally required to leave these decisions to the individual. 230 This right to choose moral answers to fundamental moral
questions is at the heart of Professor Dworkin's conception of liberty
of conscience. 231 Accordingly, Professor Dworkin makes a sophisticated argument for bracketing moral issues. True morality, which respects human dignity and autonomy, requires that government leave
citizens free to choose the good for themselves.232 Hence, Professor
226. Id
227. Id. Professor Dworkin notes:
If we aim at responsibility, we must leave citizens free ... to decide as they
think right, because that is what moral responsibility entails. But if we aim
at conformity, we demand instead that citizens act in a way that might be
contrary to their own moral convictions; this discourages rather than encourages them to develop their own sense of when and why life is sacred.
Id. at 150-51. Professor Dworkin further argues that the state cannot employ the
second option; it may not curtail liberty in the name of an intrinsic value if "the effect
on one group of citizens would be special and grave, when the community is seriously
divided about what respect for that value requires, and when people's opinions about
the nature of that value reflect essentially religious convictions that are fundamental
to moral personality." Id. at 157.
228. Id. at 239.
229. Id.
230. Id
231. Id.
232. See Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers' Brief, N.Y.
Rev. Books, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41 (reprint of the Brief for Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.) (en banc)
(No. 95-1858) submitted to the Supreme Court by renowned moral and political philosophers in favor of protecting a right to physician-assisted suicide) (noting that
"every competent person has the right to make momentous personal decisions which
invoke fundamental religious or philosophical convictions about life's value for himself"). Judge Reinhardt, in Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996),
does not attempt a comprehensive Dworkinian moral defense for the permissibility of
physician-assisted suicide. One similar moral argument that Judge Reinhardt does
suggest is that assisted suicide should be allowed because it is more humane to allow
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Dworkin, in the guise of permitting public moral arguments, has
merely argued for a minimalist liberal position in a nuanced way.
B. Professor Sandel and Compassion in Dying: A Republican
Confrontationwith Public Moral Argument
While Professors Dworkin and Sandel agree on the need for moral
argument in the public sphere, they differ in fundamental ways. Professor Sandel would embrace Professor Dworkin's attempt to bring
moral argument to the fore of constitutional interpretation. Professor
Sandel would take issue, however, with Professor Dworkin's conception of the manner and place of moral argument in constitutional democracy. Professor Dworkin's reasoning demonstrates, as discussed
in the previous section, 3 that there are moral arguments, as opposed
to merely toleration arguments, for "bracketing" comprehensive
moral questions in the public sphere and defending the privacy rights
he conceives as essential to both assuring human dignity and the
proper functioning of democratic government 3 ' Professor Sandel
would argue, however, that Professor Dworkin's underlying liberal
conception of the human person causes him both to misconceive the
terminally ill individuals to die with the aid of their physicians through suicide than it
is to force them to suffer a painful and undignified end. Il at 812. Judge Reinhardt
argues that technological advances make it possible for human beings in a state of
terminal illness to linger longer than ever before. I& As a result, Judge Reinhardt
argues that there is less dignity in dying today than in the past. l. He claims the
Supreme Court in Cruzan recognized a constitutionally protected right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Id at 815. Judge Reinhardt views Cruzan as a first step
toward enhancing the fading dignity of modem death. Id at 816. The right to physician-assisted suicide, in Judge Reinhardt's conception, extends this dignity-enhancing
right to terminally ill patients who, like those who require unwanted medical treatment to continue living, wish to end their pain and suffering. it.
Dignity in Compassion in Dying however, is defined strictly in terms of individual
autonomy. See id. at 820 (noting that "[w]hen patients are no longer able to pursue
liberty or happiness and do not wish to pursue life, the state's interest in forcing them
to remain alive is clearly less compelling"). Judge Reinhardt, in the Dworkinian tradition, argues that the constitutional scheme protects this autonomous conception of
the human person. Id at 800. The only moral standard against which the state's interest may be judged is the overriding precedence of individual autonomy. Id. at 805.
The state's interest in preventing suicide flows from the senselessness of life prematurely taken, id. at 817, but in the case of life bereft of dignity, as Judge Reinhardt
conceives it, the assisted suicide is not senseless and death does not come too early.
Id. at 821.
Judge Reinhardt argued that the state's interest in protecting the poor and minorities from undue influence, id at 825, extended only to ensuring that they could exercise their own autonomous decisions. The state has a duty to ensure that the poor,
along with the rich, are able to obtain the means to end their lives with dignity. Id.
The role of the state here is not to advocate one moral position over another. Rather,
Judge Reinhardt views the state as under an obligation to empower all citizens with
the ability to exercise autonomous moral judgment privately.
233. See supra part V.A.
234. Dworkin, Life's Dominion, supra note 102, at 14-15.
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essence of liberty of conscience and forces him to accept an existential
moral intractability where none exists.
For Professor Sandel, liberty of conscience is not the right to choose
certain beliefs over others, but rather, the right to hold and express
certain beliefs and duties that are part of who we are prior to any
choices that we make.235 The Constitution protects religious duties,
not because we choose them, but because they have a "tendency to
promote the habits and dispositions that make good citizens. '23 6 The
Constitution does not prescind moral argument from the public
square. To the contrary, the very goal of republican government is to
make policy as the result of good moral argument.237 The Constitution wisely enshrines certain beliefs and duties, like religious duties or
loyalty to family, as inviolable not because they are necessarily the
result of moral deliberation or argument but because, even though
they may be impervious to rational argument, they nonetheless tend
to promote the virtues necessary for republican citizenship. 238 Under
Professor Sandel's reasoning, decisions about the morality of abortion, homosexuality, and physician assisted suicide have nothing to do
with freedom of conscience precisely because they are moral decisions. Thus, these moral decisions, in contrast to potentially premoral convictions like religious duties, are the proper subject of rational, public moral debate. Political legitimacy for decisions on these
moral questions, in a republican scheme, flows from resolution of
these questions in reasoned public deliberation.
C. Sandelian Arguments for and Against Physician Assisted Suicide
One can envision Sandelian arguments both for and against protecting the right to physician-assisted suicide. This section explores both
possibilities and argues that, whatever the substantive outcome, moral
argument must be taken seriously to secure legitimacy for the decision. This is so because the starting point, in our republican constitutional scheme, for the argument about whether a substantive due
process right exists is not whether such a right would guard autonomy.
Rather, the constitutional interpreter must ask whether the right in
question protects a practice which makes good citizens.2 3 9 This type
235. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 66.
236. Id
237. See id. at 127 (noting that "[t]he point of politics was not to broker competing
interests but to transcend them, to seek the good of the community as a whole ....
[I]ndependence would be a source of moral regeneration... and renew the moral
spirit").
238. Id at 321-23. Professor Sandel argues that liberalism, far from protecting individuals from tyranny of the majority, so limits the political debate that intolerance
and simple moralisms of weak-minded majorities now threaten our ability to govern
ourselves and sustain our moral independence.
239. See id. at 5-6 (noting that "[t]o share in self-rule therefore requires that citizens possess, or come to acquire .... civic virtues .... The republican conception of
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of reasoning is ends-focused because it connects constitutional protection of a practice with the life and health of the polity conceived specifically in republican terms. Such ends-focused reasoning renders
constitutional decisions legitimate because it avoids the intractable
character of arguments about the essential dignity of the human person and what it requires contemplated by the aspirational model of
constitutional rights. Finally, this section discusses Professor Sandel's
conception of when judicial review can be legitimately exercised to
protect a constitutional right.
1. Sandelian Moral Arguments for and against Legal Protection of
Physician-Assisted Suicide
To protect a right to physician-assisted suicide, Professor Sandel
would ground the right in some relationship that secures goods necessary to the proper functioning of the polity. Here, an analogy to how
he would argue the case for protection of homosexual relationships
may be instructive. Unlike the dissent in Bowers, Professor Sandel
would not rely on some autonomous notion of privacy with regard to
sexual decisions. Rather, Professor Sandel would rely heavily on the
Griswold precedent.
The privacy protected in Griswold was closely tied to the virtues
that marriage cultivates in the spouses.' ° Those virtues are also necessary to the functioning of the republic. Some measure of sexual privacy is necessary to cultivate those virtues. Therefore, use of
contraceptives in marriage, free from state surveillance, is constitutionally protected.
An interpreter who wanted to take moral argument seriously could
argue that the virtues which the marriage relationship cultivates are
also present in homosexual intimacy, and thus, homosexual intimacy
should be similarly protected." ' It is not hard to see that someone
wanting to protect the right to physician-assisted suicide might analogize the practice protected by that right to the practice of marital intimacy protected by the Griswold right to privacy. In the physician
assisted suicide context the necessary relationship is the physician/patient relationship. This relationship is traditionally protected and
secures certain human goods, such as trust, physical and psychological
health, and planning for the future of one's family and oneself. Privacy in this relationship is essential to its proper functioning and to
securing the virtues for society that the relationship creates?242 Therefreedom... requires a... politics that cultivates in citizens the qualities of character
self-government requires").
240. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
241. See Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration, supra note 113, at 535.
242. See Cheryl K. Smith, What About Legalized Assisted Suicide?, 8 Issues L &

Med. 503, 511-13 (1993) (arguing that trust in the physiciantpatient relationship requires allowing physicians to help terminate the lives of terminally ill patients); T.
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fore, how a physician and patient plan the treatment of illness is a
matter which the state should not police, at least not to the point of
taking the decision away completely from the protected relationship.
To do so would unnecessarily burden the relationship and constitute
impermissible surveillance.
The case for physician-assisted suicide, however, is much harder to
make than the case for marital privacy or even homosexual intimacy.
Initially, it is much harder to see what concrete virtues the physician/
patient relationship cultivates, much less how these virtues are essential to full participation in self-government. Furthermore, the physician/patient relationship is not the only relevant relationship, or
necessarily the most intimate. Should not the patient's responsibility
to his/her family, emotionally as well as financially, play into the decision? Could the state require some consultation with family before
allowing the patient to take some final, drastic action? Finally, as the
recent death of Joseph Cardinal Bernadin makes clear, 2 3 does not the
polity benefit from witnessing suffering well borne and also from having to care for those who suffer? Is there no virtue to be found in
suffering, both for those who suffer and for those of us who should
care for them?
Democratic resolution of these fundamentally moral questions in
republican political debate is the best way to secure legitimacy for
political decisions. As noted earlier, however, these moral questions
should be resolved in terms of whether protecting physician-assisted
suicide or prohibiting it will help promote the virtues in the citizenry
244
necessary for the proper functioning of this particular type of polity.
Only this type of ends-focused justification will result in legitimacy for
the substantive decision.
2. Outlining Sandelian Objections to Judicial Protection of a Right
to Physician-Assisted Suicide
The previous subsection outlined the political/moral arguments for
and against physician-suicide and argued that resolution of these arguments based on republican public moral debate was the only way to
secure legitimacy for the substantive decision. This does not answer
Howard Stone & William J. Winslade, Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasiain

the United States: Legal and Ethical Observations, 16 J. Legal Med. 481, 483 (1995)
(arguing that the law should not interfere with the private physician/patient relationship); Lori D. Pritchard Clark, Comment, Rx: Dosage of Legislative Reform to Accommodate Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide, 23 Cap. U. L. Rev. 689, 710-14

(1994) (arguing that developing models of the physician/patient relationship allow for
physician-assisted suicide). But see Paul Wilkes, The Next Pro-Lifers,N.Y. Tunes, July
21, 1996, (Magazine) at 22 (arguing that physician-assisted suicide could destroy the
traditional doctor/patient relationship).
243. Joseph Cardinal Bernadin, The Gift of Peace (1997) (reflecting on the integral
nature of human suffering).
244. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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the question, however, of whether the judiciary should leave the resolution of the moral question of physician-assisted suicide to the political branches. This subsection explores Professor Sandel's conception
of judicial review and when it can be exercised to secure legitimacy for
substantive moral outcomes.
In the republican conception, judicial review of legislative action
should be limited, especially if that action is the result of profound and
24 5
sustained debate about the moral value of the practice in question.
An overly aggressive judiciary retards the creation of virtue in 2the citizenry because it limits the results of the deliberative process. 46
Judge O'Scannlain, in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit's majority
decision denying a rehearing en bancA 7 of the decision in Compassion
in Dying, attacked, in Sandelian terms, the analogy between physician
assisted suicide and abortion. At the same time, he showed the logical
futility of grounding fundamental rights strictly on notions of human
autonomy. The majority in Compassion in Dying drew a parallel between a person's decision to enlist a doctor's aid in the termination of
her own life and a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy, 2"
based on a notion that the holding in Casey enshrines the woman's
right to choose as the most sacredly guarded constitutional value .'9
Because of the intimacy of the decision and the need to guard the
choice from state interference, the right to an abortion is "like" the
right to assisted suicide. This ends-divorced reasoning, however,
leaves open to constitutional protection all types of choices, like po-

245. See generally Jeffrey Rosen, What Right to Die?, New Republic, June 24, 1996,
at 28 (discussing the problems of aggressive judicial review).
246. See Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra note 35, at 117 (noting that, "According to [republican] tradition, liberty depends on self-government, and self-government depends on the members of a political community's identifying with the role
of citizen and acknowledging the obligations that citizenship entails"). Judge
O'Scannlain has nicely articulated the republican objection to aggressive judicial review. As he conceives it, the proper arena for moral argument in a republican regime
is the legislature, duly elected by the people. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 85
F.3d 1440, 1442-43 (9th Cir.) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Founding Fathers
did not establish the United States as a democratic republic so that elected officials
would decide trivia, while all great questions would be decided by the judiciary."
(quoting Judge Kleinfeld in dissent in the en banc decision, Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 858 (9th Cir. 1996) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting))), cert. granted
sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. CL 37 (1996). The majority in Compassion in Dying, he argued, appropriated the power of the legislature and cut off moral
debate on the question of physician-assisted suicide. Physicians in favor of assisted
suicide presented a strong moral case for allowing the practice; however, Judge
O'Scannlain argued that these arguments should have been presented to the legislature. Id at 1443.
247. Compassion in Dying, 85 F.3d at 1440 (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting).
248. Id at 1444.
249. Id
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lygamy, prostitution, and the use of illicit 25drugs,
regardless of their
0
connection, if any, to the life of the polity.
Although Professor Sandel does not adopt the strictly backward
looking notion of substantive due process as articulated by the majority in Bowers, such that there are no fundamental rights if they are not
"deeply rooted in the Nation's history and tradition,"' he does argue
that only those rights which "are implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty ' '1 52 are protected. Professor Sandel would argue that practices
which promote the virtues necessary for a republican regime are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Those wishing to protect such
practices must demonstrate that connection. The difference between
Professor Sandel and a strictly backward looking substantive due process model is that Professor Sandel acknowledges that the argument
for protecting
more modem practices, like homosexuality, can be
3
made.2
Absent a showing that physician-assisted suicide is a practice that
promotes virtues necessary for self-government, such a practice is not
entitled to heightened judicial protection. Thus, those in favor of the
practice must make that case in the legislature, confronting those who
muster compelling moral arguments against the practice. 54 It is the
elected representatives of the people who should make the final decision about the necessity for the right.
CONCLUSION

Political argument is about morality. People differ on what it is
good for us to do as a polity. Compassion in Dying v. Washington
provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to revisit its substantive due process jurisprudence and to render that jurisprudence
politically legitimate. This Note has explored the traditional attempts
by aspirationalism and originalism to secure legitimacy for substantive
due process rights. These attempts have cheapened our political discourse and robbed the Supreme Court's opinions of legitimacy. Republican theories of constitutional interpretation, on the other hand,
250. Id. The problem with the majority's reasoning is that there is no place to draw
the line about which practices are constitutionally protected and which are not. An
ends-focused reasoning, one where rights are protected only if they promote virtues
necessary to sustaining republican regimes, has a built-in stopping point for determining which practices merit constitutional protection. See id. (noting that "[t]he majority's method of constitutional interpretation lays the foundation for the discovery of
an endless parade of protected liberty interests involving choices that could be cast as
'intimate' and 'personal' ").
251. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 849 (9th Cir.) (Beezer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986)), cert. granted sub
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
252. Id- at 848-49 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
253. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
254. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 851-55 (Beezer, J., dissenting) (outlining the
moral arguments against physician assisted suicide).
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may help us to regain our sense of self-government and aid us in recreating an American political community because they take moral
argument seriously. This is so because the difficult moral argument, if
convincingly made, can secure legitimacy for either the permissibility
or prohibition of morally questionable practices. But, even those who
find certain practices morally problematic might be able to accept
such practices if they are persuaded that a particular practice promotes civic virtue and contributes to a healthy polity.
Accordingly, courts should engage in an ends-focused, practical reasoning in making determinations about the existence of constitutional
rights. Such reasoning is practical, rather than metaphysical, because
it focuses the participants on a common starting point, namely, the
republican polity. There is more hope for reaching a consensus concerning the type of polity our Constitution establishes and what that
polity needs to sustain it than there is for reaching agreement on abstract philosophical questions of human dignity and what rights that
dignity demands. Only through this type of moral consensus-building
can true legitimacy for fundamental political decisions be achieved.

